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THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OR THE
ELEPHANT IN THE MOUSEHOLE?
THE LEGAL RISKS (AND PROMISE) OF
CLIMATE POLICY UNDER § 115 OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT
NATHAN RICHARDSON*
Climate policy in the United States is near an inflection point. With Congress
uninterested in new legislation,focus at the federal level for most of the last decade has
been on the Clean Air Act, but whether regulation under that old statute can successfully
address carbon emissions remains unclear. Under President Obama, the EPA has
focused on two core programs-vehicle emissions standards and the Clean Power Plan,
aimed at fossil fuel power plants. But with the latter of these programs under legal
challenge, and both falling short of the flexible, economy-wide policy many believe is
necessay, academic and policy attention is turning to an additional Clean Air Act
provision. Section 115 of the Clean Air Act is aimed at internationalairpollution, and
its advocates suggest it could be a vehicle to achieve deeper emissions reductions, perhaps
including nationwide cap and trade or a carbon tax. This paper critically examines
§ 115 and its supporters' claims, concluding that it holds great promise but also comes
with legal risks. A court considering the inevitable legal challenge to § 115 regulation
might deem it a legal "mousehole" that Congress could not have intended to cany the
weight of the climate policy "elephant," or it might rule that § 115 is limited to
"conventional" pollutants rather than extending to carbon.
There are strong
counterarguments to both of these, but each remains a real legal risk and has likely been
underappreciatedby supporters of§ 115. Even if§ 115 survives such facial challenges,
other legal challenges (if successful) could prevent it from being able to match its
advocates' ambitions. Most of these narrower challenges appear relatively weak, however.
Section 115'spromise makes it worth pursuing but with caution.

* Assistant Professor, University of South Carolina Law School. Special thanks to
Dallas Burtraw and Art Fraas of Resources for the Future for encouraging the research that
led to this Article, and to Dave Hawkins and many others for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA1 and the
2009 failure of cap-and-trade legislation in Congress, the venerable (and
justly venerated) Clean Air Act has become the primary vehicle for climate
policy at the federal level. Two Clean Air Act programs aimed at the
largest-emitting sectors of the economy have formed the centerpiece of
climate policy under the Obama administration: substantially tighter
emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for
road vehicles, 2 and the Clean Power Plan, which sets limits on emissions

1. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); 2017 and Later
Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
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from existing fossil fuel power plants. 3 Of these two programs, the former is
well under way, albeit soon up for midterm review. 4 Surprisingly, the latter
was stayed in early 2016 by the Supreme Court pending resolution of legal
challenges. 5 The future of climate policy under the Clean Air Act therefore
remains in flux and under real legal threat. That threat, along with alleged
limitations of the Clean Power Plan, has led some to call for a renewed look
at legislative options.
But might there be another climate policy option in the Act-a path not
taken, possibly superior in important respects to the Clean Power Plan?
Some, among them leading environmental law scholars, say yes. 6 Section
115 of the Act, 7 a section explicitly aimed at international emissions
problems, is (they claim) a valid alternative or even superior vehicle within
the statute for climate policy. 8 According to its proponents, § 115 gives the
EPA and states the necessary authority and flexibility to effectively and
cost-effectively limit carbon emissions from much of the U.S. economy.
Advocates suggest that § 115 might even allow the EPA to oversee state
implementation of a national carbon cap-and-trade or tax system. 9
Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537).
3. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
4. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,628.
5. SeeWestVirginiav. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
6. See Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW PUBLIC LAw RESEARCH PAPER No.
16-11 (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2742366.
7. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (2012).
8. It remains unclear whether advocates view § 115 as a substitute for the Clean Power
Plan or a complement to it. To my knowledge, however, no § 115 advocate has publicly
suggested that the Clean Power Plan be abandoned in favor of § 115 (though some did
suggest § 115 was superior to § 111 (d) as a climate policy vehicle before the EPA made its
initial choice). This implies that advocates view the two as complements, or at least that they
believe the Clean Power Plan is not sufficiently inferior to scrap before the outcome of its
legal challenges are known. Suggesting that the Clean Power Plan should be quickly
abandoned is not necessarily a radical position if one believes § 115 is a superior vehicle,
however. As discussed below, legal challenges to the two are similar in important respects,
and if one believes § 115 is both substantively superior and more likely to survive challenge,
then Clean Power Plan litigation risks creating harmful precedent for § 115 without much
policy payoff.
9. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at i-vi.
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This paper is an attempt at an honest assessment of the legal risks
associated with climate policy under § 115, along with some important
policy limitations.' 0 In short, acting on climate change via § 115 carries
significant legal risks, similar in magnitude to those associated with the
Clean Power Plan. Among other risks, the brevity that lends § 115 its
flexibility could leave it without sufficient specificity to convince judges that
Congress intended it to authorize the sweeping, economy-wide regulatory
program necessary for carbon emissions. An interpretation of § 115 to
allow such a program may also not be entitled to Chevron deference."
Especially taken together, these risks increase the chances that a reviewing
court would reject § 115 climate regulation entirely. Moreover, the
magnitude of these risks may be strongly influenced by the Clean Power
Plan litigation-some of the same arguments may apply in both challenges,
and the earlier litigation will indicate how receptive the relevant courts (the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, likely with a new justice) will be to
those arguments.
In addition to these general or facial risks, important practical elements
of § 115 climate policy such as allocation of emissions reduction
responsibility to states may be legally difficult for EPA, largely because
12
Even if not fatal to
§ 115 lacks any real guidance on program structure.
§ 115, these legal limitations should somewhat temper enthusiasm
grounded in § 115's relatively blank policy slate. 13
But no one of these risks is obviously fatal to § 115 climate policy, and
§ 115's advocates are correct to identify important advantages of the
provision, chiefly its flexibility and ability to apply across different sectors of
the economy simultaneously. These advantages may make pursuing § 115
worthwhile, especially if the Clean Power Plan is rejected by courts, even
though the path between legal risks for § 115 will be narrow.

A full analysis of the policy and economic implications of § 115 (rather than the
legal analysis here) is not only beyond the scope of this paper (and my ability), but in many
respects impossible in the absence of a more concrete sense of what form § 115 climate
regulation would take. Section 115's flexibility and open-endedness is one of its key
advantages as a policy vehicle, but this feature makes early policy analysis particularly
10.

difficult.
11. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(pioneering the doctrine ofjudicial deference to agency interpretations of law).
12. Infra Part I1.
13. See id.
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I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND CLIMATE:

§ 115

IN CONTEXT

The Clean Air Act is an expansive statute, with a wide range of
authorities granted to the EPA, states, or both to limit air pollution. Before
the EPA's plans became clear between 2011 and 2013,14 the suitability of
many provisions of the statute for regulating carbon emissions was
considered and debated both within and outside the EPA.15 The major
programs announced to date use only two of these authorities, however.
CAFE standards are based on the federal government's well-understood
authority to regulate new motor vehicle emissions under Title II of the
statute t 6 and the Clean Power Plan is based on much less well-understood
joint federal-state authority over existing stationary emissions sources
under § 11 l(d).17
Other regulatory options, such as listing greenhouse
gases (GHGs) as a seventh "criteria" pollutant and setting national air
quality standards, were rejected by the EPA.18 As it stands today, Title II
and § 111 are the vehicles for Clean Air Act climate policy.
For reasons that remain somewhat unclear, this debate over which Clean
Air Act authorities should be used to regulate carbon has been at least
partially reopened. 19 Specifically, legal and policy scholars have directed

14. See Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on Climate Change (June
25, 2013) ("So today, for the sake of our children, and the health and safety of all Americans,
I'm directing the Environmental Protection Agency to put an end to the limitless dumping
of carbon pollution from our power plants, and complete new pollution standards for both
new and existing power plants"), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/201 3 /06/25/remarks-president-climate-change.
15. See, e.g., Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed.
Reg. 44,354 (proposedJuly 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1); Nathan Richardson
et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act. Structure, Effects, & Implications of a
Knowable Pathway, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,098 (2011) [hereinafter Richardson et al., Structure,
Effects, and Implications].
16. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,627 (Oct. 15, 2012)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537).
17. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
18. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 44,367 (describing setting national air quality standards for GHGs as fraught with "major
difficulties").
19. To speculate, the most obvious reason to consider § 115 is the serious legal
challenge currently facing the Clean Power Plan. Another possibility is that the Paris
climate agreement has renewed interest in international climate policy options, for which
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renewed attention toward § 115 of the statute, dealing with international
pollution.2 0 Using § 115 for climate policy is not a new legal discovery.
The section has existed in recognizable form since 1965,21 and there is
evidence that at least some in Congress contemplated the provision being
used for GHGs at the time. 22 Using § 115 for climate regulation was
examined by the EPA in 2008,23 and was discussed by legal scholars (myself
included) around 2009-2010,24 most notably and extensively by Hannah
Chang. 25 Nevertheless, attention has recently refocused2 7on § 115 from
policy circles 26 and in the form of major new legal analysis.
This renewed interest may be in response to continuing litigation that
has stalled the Clean Power Plan (under the view that § 115 might provide
a smoother legal pathway), or it could be aimed at laying early groundwork
for emissions reduction policies that go beyond the Clean Power Plan, or
both. Recent advocacy for § 115 is ambiguous on this point, sometimes
characterizing § 115 as an "alternative" to existing policy and sometimes
highlighting its compatibility. 28 At least for now, however, ambiguity on
§ 115 is the best vehicle under current US law. Alternatively, climate policy advocates may
already be looking beyond the power sector covered by the Clean Power Plan and may have
concluded that replicating that approach for other sectors is inferior to a broad policy under

§ 115.
See, e.g., Burger et al., supra note 6.
21. See Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272,
79 Stat. 992 (1965).
22. See Tom Udall, A New (Old) Approach on Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16,
20.

2016, 5:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-udall/a-new-old-approach-oncli_b_11552626.html.
23. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 44,482.
24. See Roger Martella & Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under Section
115 of the Clean Air Act, DAILY ENV'T REP. 1 (2009); see also Richardson et al., Structure, Effects,
and Implications, supra note 15, at 10,103.
25. See Hannah Chang, Cap and Trade Under the Clean Air Act?: Rethinking § 115, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,894 (2010).
Greg Dotson & Joe Romm, How the Paris Climate Agreement Super-Charges the
26. See, e.g.,
Clean Air Act, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 14, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/how-the-paris7
climate-agreement-super-charges-the-clean-air-act-d 220e399833#.y3ryz5p9g; see also Brian
Potts, Obama's Hidden Climate Leverage, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2016, 5:34 AM),
34
.
http:/ /www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/paris-climate-deal-epa-obama-0000
See Burger et al., supra note 6.
28. See id. at 2 ("The alternative to using Section 115 to address [Greenhouse Gas]
GHG emissions from stationary sources is a series of source-specific regulations under
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act."); see also id. at 63 ("Any action EPA undertakes pursuant
27.

2017]

THE LEGAL RISKS (AWD PROMISE) OF CLIMA TE POLICr

this point is probably politically wise, so as not to disturb hard-won policy
gains or inflame turf battles over preferred policies.
In any case, there is significant renewed interest in § 115. By all
accounts, the Clean Power Plan and vehicle emissions standards remain the
primary federal regulatory programs limiting carbon emissions. EPA's
most likely next step is programs like the Clean Power Plan for other
emitting sectors.2 9 But should the Clean Power Plan be wholly or
substantially rejected by courts, an alternative will be needed-that is,
unless an opportunity emerges in Congress for new legislation. EPA could
also decide that § 111 (d) is less suitable for sectors other than electric power
and seek an alternative approach while preserving the Clean Power Plan in
its domain.
In either case, § 115 appears to be the most likely alternative, or at least
the only one currently under serious discussion in the policy and legal
communities. Barring renewed congressional interest in climate legislation,
therefore, § 115 seems to be the next frontier for national climate policy.
Even if one is optimistic that Congress will eventually pass comprehensive
climate legislation, successful EPA regulation in the meantime could
provide a valuable template or identify problems to avoid.
II. THE CASE FOR § 115 CLIMATE REGULATION
Why such interest in § 115 for climate? The case for its suitability has
been ably made elsewhere and will only be summarized here-the focus of
this paper is the degree of legal risk associated with using § 115 for climate.
But it is nevertheless necessary to summarize the policy arguments in favor
of§ 115.
At the risk of oversimplification, § 115's appeal stems largely from the
fact that it, in contrast to many provisions of the Clean Air Act, is fairly
simple. Once the EPA identifies harmful cross-border pollution and
establishes that other countries give the United States reciprocal emissionsreducing rights, § 115 allows the agency to demand that states reduce that
pollution, within the same process that states use to comply with other parts

to Section 115 will take place while EPA also implements other critical GHG emissions
regulations, including.., the Clean Power Plan ...").
29. See Nathan Richardson, A Quick Legal FAQ on EPA's Clean Power Plan, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE (July 14, 2015), http://www.rff.org/blog/2015/quick-legal-faq-epa-sclean-power-plan.
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of the statute. 30 This simplicity (or rather, lack of specificity) appears to
allow the EPA to fill in the blanks, crafting a policy designed explicitly for
GHGs rather than being forced to shoehorn regulation of those emissions,
with their unique challenges, into more or less rigid and well-established
regulatory programs. In short, § 115 appears to offer great breadth and
flexibility for the environmental problem that needs that flexibility the
most.
But even before considering its flexibility, the first and most obvious
31
If one were to
attraction of§ 115 is its title: "International air pollution."
naively read through the list of section titles in the statute looking for the
provision governing GHGs, after overcoming one's initial surprise and
disappointment at not finding a specific provision on point, the most
appealing section title would probably be that of § 115. Climate change is a
truly global environmental problem, most GHGs are globally mixed, and
any real solution to the problem of carbon emissions must be international.
32
In fact, § 115 applies only to international pollution.
Enthusiasm for § 115 goes beyond its title and international scope,
however. Advocates suggest it is a better, more flexible vehicle for climate
33
policy than the EPA's current path under the Clean Air Act.
A. The Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price
Understanding § 115's appeal in policy practice requires a brief diversion
A major
to discuss the limitations of the EPA's current approach.
Air Act
the
Clean
under
GHGs
regulate
to
limitation of the agency's efforts
is that current programs are inflexible and limited in scope. The Clean
34
and CAFE
Power Plan applies only to existing fossil power plants,

30. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (2012) (linking state compliance under §115
to the well-established National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) compliance
process under §110).
31. Id.§7415.
32. See id. § 7415(a) (indicating that the Section applies only to air pollutants "emitted in
the United States [that] cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country. ..").
33. See, e.g., Burger et al., supra note 6, at i (suggesting that §115 "could provide one of
the most effective and efficient means to address climate change pollution in the United
States").
34. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
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emissions standards only to new motor vehicles. 35 GHG emissions from
other sectors are for the most part currently unregulated, and the EPA
announced no detailed plans to regulate them. 36 Both programs use more
or less traditional regulatory approaches, 37 rather than directly imposing a
single carbon price (via tax or cap and trade), which most economists would
argue is more effective. Coordinating the state- or regional-level
implementation of emissions reduction in the Clean Power Plan in a sector
(electric power) that serves customers across state lines also presents difficult
implementation challenges. State-level choices could interfere with power
markets and raise costs or worsen emissions outcomes. 38 These limitations
likely mean emissions reductions under EPA's current climate policy plans
will be smaller and more costly than necessary.
These critiques can easily be oversold. Transportation and electric
power generation are the largest-emitting sectors of the economy, so it
makes sense to regulate their emissions first, and in any case the EPA must
start somewhere. Also, both programs are in fact relatively flexible. The
vehicle emissions standards allow some inter-manufacturer and

35. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 85, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 536, 537).
36. EPA has imposed permitting requirements on certain major new GHG-emitting
stationary sources and new regulations on methane emissions related to oil and gas
production. See Revisions to the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Permitting Regulations and Establishment of a Significant
Emissions Rate (SER) for GHG Emissions under the PSD Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,110,
68,110-13, 68,115 (proposed Oct. 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 70,
71); see also Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and
Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,823 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
37. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,663 ("EPA is establishing a CO2 emission
performance rate"); see also 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,627
("EPA is establishing standards that are projected to require, on an average industry fleet
wide basis, 163 grams/mile of carbon dioxide (C02) in model year 2025 .... ").
38. See Dallas Burtraw et. al., A ProximateMirror: Greenhouse Gas Rules and StrategicBehavior
Under the US Clean Air Act, 62 ENV'T AND RESOURCE ECON. 217, 220 (2015) (finding that
"because the emissions rate standard does not place a cap on total emissions, this policy
combination can increase emissions overall compared with the outcome if both regions have
an emissions rate standard"); see alsoJames B. Bushnell et al., Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level
Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan (Energy Inst., Working Paper No. 255, rev. 2016),
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP255.pdf#page= 1#page= 1.
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intertemporal trading,3 9 and the EPA actively encourages states to adopt
40
emissions trading systems under the Clean Power Plan.
Nevertheless, many climate policy experts view the siloed, sector-bysector nature of the Clean Air Act regulation and its relative inflexibility as
significant limitations of the statute as a climate policy vehicle, especially in
the long run. 4 1 The standard solution is new legislation, such as a national
carbon tax or cap-and-trade program. 42 Such a cross-sector, nationwide
approach would be simpler and likely more cost-effective than the EPA's
current regulatory pathway. 43 Under a cap-and-trade scheme, emissions
allowance auction or trading markets would quickly identify the emitters
with the ability to reduce emissions at the lowest cost, regardless of what
sector of the economy they operate in. Similarly, under a carbon tax, each
emitter would be pressed to reduce carbon emissions, but only to the point
where doing so is more cost-effective than paying the tax.
The advantages of these approaches can also be expressed in terms of
information and expertise-instead of trying to get the emissions reduction
targets for each sector "right" under a Clean Power Plan style approach,
regulators under a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system would have only one
key variable to set-the price or quantity of emissions. Of course, in
reality, either a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program would have plenty of
epicyclic complexity, political trade-offs, and implementation complexity.
But at its core, it would be a simpler and, many believe, more effective and
cost-effective approach.
The Clean Air Act has been generally understood to deny the EPA
authority to enact such nationwide and economy-wide emissions pricing
schemes (hence efforts to pass cap-and-trade in Congress in 2009).44 This is
reflected in the EPA's current sector-by-sector approach, embodied in
39. See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,628 ("As proposed, the
agencies are finalizing several provisions which provide compliance flexibility to
manufacturers to meet the standards without compromising the program's overall
environmental and energy security objectives.").
40. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,666 ("Each state will have the opportunity to
take advantage of a wide variety of strategies for reducing CO 2 emissions from affected
EGUs, including... mass-based trading...").
41. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson & Arthur G. Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and Carbon
Price, 44 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,472, 10,479-82 (2014).
42.
43.

See id.
Id. at 10,477-79.

44.

American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11lth Cong. (2009).
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vehicle emissions standards and the Clean Power Plan. As noted above,
both programs include or encourage states to include some form of
emissions trading, but such trading is limited in scope.
B. § 115: An Overlooked Carbon Price Opportunity?
Advocates of § 115 claim that it can escape these limitations of the Clean
Air Act, overcoming siloed regulation by positioning states to make crosssector plans and creating an opportunity for a national carbon price (tax or
cap and trade) without new legislation. 45 To see how this might be possible,
it is necessary to briefly explore the powers available under § 115 after it is
triggered.
Once the EPA has made a threshold "endangerment finding" under
§ 115, it must then "give formal notification" of the finding to the relevant
states (i.e., those states from which pollution that is causing foreign harms
originates). 46 That notification then obligates the states to revise their State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) to "prevent or eliminate" the endangering
47
pollution.
SIPs are the core of on-the-ground air pollution regulation driven by the
Clean Air Act. They are primarily the means by which states regulate
emissions of the six "criteria" pollutants identified by the EPA (such as
sulfur dioxide, lead, and particulate matter) and for which National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are set by the federal agency. 48
State SIPs detail how the state will reduce concentrations of criteria
pollutants in areas that exceed the standards and maintain concentrations
in areas that meet the NAAQS.49 SIPs have been used for decades, are
continually updated, and are a familiar process for both states and the EPA.
The EPA is responsible for reviewing and approving SIPs, and the
agency may step in if states fail. 50 States are responsible for proposing and
actually implementing the emissions regulations embodied by the SIPs.51
In practice, most emissions sources are regulated in a direct and

45. Seegeneraly, Chang, supra note 25; see also Burger et al., supra note 6, at 81 ("[Section
115] would allow EPA and the states to combine multiple sectors and source types in a
single rulemaking that could establish a nationwide, cross-sectoral emissions trading
program").
46. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (2012).
47. Id. § 7415(b).
48.
49.
50.

Id. § 7410(a)(1).
Id.
Id. § 7410(c).

51.

Id. § 7410(a)(2).
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However, states must increase the
fundamentally prescriptive way.
stringency of their SIPs and require additional emissions cuts when the
NAAQS are not achieved, sometimes leading to policy innovation and
regulation of previously unregulated activities.
The SIP process is complex and can be unwieldy, but it is well
understood and, crucially in the § 115/climate context, it is flexible. In
fact, the SIP process is not hobbled by some of the limitations of the Clean
Power Plan and vehicle emissions standards identified above.
First, it is an economy-wide regulatory process, or at least nearly so,
rather than taking the sector-by-sector approach of Title II (vehicles only)
or § 111 (d) (separate rulemakings for each industrial sector). With their
SIPs, states are responsible for meeting pollution targets set by the EPA
(such as the NAAQS), but neither the statute nor the EPA generally direct
states on how to allocate the burden of meeting those targets. States may
allocate emissions reductions among sectors as they see fit, whether for
reasons of efficiency or politics. 52 There are a few limitations on the ability
of states to regulate vehicle emissions, discussed below, but otherwise states
are given a free hand.
This free hand extends not just to who is given the emissions-cutting
burden but also to how the state regulates. Section 110 explicitly allows
states to use not just traditional command-and-control regulation but also
"economic incentives, such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of
emissions rights." 53 There is no clearer endorsement of modern, marketbased environmental regulatory tools in the Clean Air Act.
The breadth and flexibility of the SIP process convinces advocates of
§ 115 that regulation of GHGs under the section addresses the key
limitations of current Clean Air Act climate programs. Moreover, if the
EPA and the states can agree, these advocates claim that a national capand-trade program or carbon tax is authorized by § 115.54 If true, this
would very likely enable greater emissions reductions, across the entire
economy, at a lower cost than the Clean Power Plan and CAFE standards
could achieve-an environmental and economic win/win.
In short, its advocates argue, § 115 is explicitly targeted at international
pollution problems like climate change and provides unparalleled
regulatory flexibility perfectly suited to a complex, economy-wide pollution
55
problem like GHGs.

52. Id.
53.
54.

Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
See generaly Chang, supra note 25; see also Burger et al., supra note 6, at 81.

55.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at i.
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III. THRESHOLD LEGAL RISKS
Section 115 advocates' arguments that the Section is a good policy fit for
EPA-led climate regulation are appealing and in many respects persuasive.
But there are similarly compelling reasons to suspect that the § 115 path has
substantial legal risk. It is possible-though far from certain-that a
reviewing court could reject an attempt by the EPA to regulate carbon
under § 115.56 The EPA and (at least until recently) many, perhaps most,
legal scholars have taken this skeptical view. 57
This section and the two that follow consider legal arguments against
§ 115 as a vehicle for general climate regulation-that is, as a vehicle for
substantial national emissions limits enforced via flexible, market-based
tools. Litigation by states, industry groups, or both challenging any major
EPA regulation has become standard practice, and there is no reason to
think that § 115 regulation would be any exception. 58 Courts will therefore
certainly consider whether any such regulation is within the scope of
authority granted to the EPA under the Clean Air Act.
The first-and weakest-set of legal arguments against climate policy
under § 115 asserts that climate change is in some respect insufficient or
inappropriate to trigger the Section's threshold conditions, endangerment,
and reciprocity. Like many Clean Air Act provisions, § 115 has essentially
two parts: a trigger and a set of legal powers to limit or in some way
regulate air pollution. 59 Section 115's trigger relies on the international
character of a pollution problem-pollution with purely domestic effects is
60
excluded.
A. Endangerment: The InternationalTrigger
Section 1 15's statutory trigger is characterized, as in most Clean Air Act
provisions, as an "endangerment" finding. 6' That is, once the EPA has
determined that certain emissions "endanger' ''public health or welfare,"

56.

See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.

44,354, 44,482 (proposedJuly 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
57. See, e.g., Richardson et al., Structure, Effects, and Implications,supra note 15, at 10,103.
58.

See JAMES MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41561

EPA REGULATIONS: Too MUCH, Too LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? 8-37 (2016) (detailing

recent major EPA regulations and legal challenges from both industry and environmental
groups).
59. Infra Parts W.A., IV.B.
60. Infra Parts W.A.
61. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a)(2) (2012).
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then those emissions or their emitters may (often must) be regulated. 62
Section 115, however, requires that this finding be based not on the EPA's
assessment of the relevant science (as in other CAA provisions),63 but on
either "reports, surveys, or studies from any duly constituted international
agency" or a formal request by the Secretary of State. 64 These reports or
the secretary's request must identify endangerment of public health or
welfare in a foreign country caused by air pollution originating in the
United States. 65 In short, therefore, § 115 authorizes action only when
cross-border pollution has been identified as a problem by specific and
presumably trusted actors in the international system.
For GHGs, § 115's advocates suggest this trigger is easily met. The EPA
has already issued an endangerment finding for GHGs under § 202 of the
66
Clean Air Act as a prerequisite for its more stringent CAFE standards.
That finding is largely based on the consensus climate science embodied in
the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).67
The IPCC reports are "reports ... from [a] duly constituted international
agency" that would, advocates claim, be an adequate basis for a § 115
endangerment finding. 68 The only additional finding necessary for § 115
would be a showing that U.S.-sourced emissions harm health and welfare
elsewhere. That seems relatively trivial-the United States is among the
largest emitters, and effects would be felt worldwide.
Both major legal analyses of § 115 to date persuasively make this point
regarding reliance on the IPCC. To put it simply, the prerequisite trigger
for § 115 is, according to advocates, available off the shelf.69 Moreover,
even if the IPCC reports were for some reason inadequate to trigger § 115,
a request from the Secretary of State alone is sufficient. 70 Such a request

62. Id.; accord id. §§ 7408(a), 7502(a)(1).
63. See, e.g., id. § 7408(a)(2) ("Air quality criteria for an air pollutant shall accurately
reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and extent of all
identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected from the presence of
such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities.").
64.
65.
66.

Id. § 7415(a).
Id.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
67. Id.
68. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a)).
69. See Chang, supra note 25, at 10,901; Burger et al., supra note 6, at 17.
70. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a).
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would seem to be a formality if climate policy is a presidential priority or if
U.S. political obligations as part of the Paris Agreement effectively require
emissions limits.
To be sure, a § 115 endangerment finding would not be immune to
challenge.
One such challenge could be an argument that a direct
connection between U.S. emissions and specific foreign health and welfare
harms cannot be established. This argument notes that carbon is globally
mixed, that harms suffered may be difficult or impossible to attribute
conclusively to climate change, and that reductions in U.S. emissions would
not necessarily reduce harms since ultimate effects on the degree of climate
change depend on whether other countries similarly reduce their
emissions. 71 In short, this argument holds that U.S. emissions are not the
proximate cause of any danger to health and welfare elsewhere.
Even if one finds this argument rhetorically persuasive, it is unlikely to be
persuasive to a reviewing court. The Supreme Court rejected similar
arguments regarding carbon emissions from vehicles in Massachusetts v. EPA:
EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA's
refusal to regulate such emissions "contributes" to Massachusetts' injuries.
EPA nevertheless maintains that its decision not to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so insignificantly to petitioners'
injuries that the Agency cannot be haled into federal court to answer for them. For
the same reason, EPA does not believe that any realistic possibility exists that the
relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy their injuries.
That is especially so because predicted increases in greenhouse gas emissions from
developing nations, particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal
domestic decrease.
But EPA overstates its case. Its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a
small incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal
judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory
action. Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one
fell regulatory swoop ....
They instead whittle away at them over time, refining their
preferred approach as circumstances change and as they develop a more nuanced
understanding of how best to proceed ....
That a first step might be tentative does
not by itself support the notion that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine
whether that step conforms to law.72

71. This is because the U.S. share of global emissions is only around 15% (second to
China's roughly 30%).
See European Commission, Emissions Database for Global
Atmospheric Research, C02 Time Series 1990-2014 Per Region/Country (2014),
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts 1990-2014&sort=des9.
72.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-24 (2007) (citations omitted).
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A similar outcome appears likely in the context of a challenge to a § 115
endangerment finding.
Just because U.S. emissions may have an
incremental effect on climate change does not mean U.S. emissions have no
effect (or no legally cognizable effect). Moreover, the fact that other
countries' lack of action could render U.S. action ineffective goes to the
effectiveness of subsequent policy, not the threshold question of whether
U.S. emissions endanger health and welfare.
The attribution-causation argument against endangerment under § 115
seems similarly weak. Carbon emissions are no different from other air
emissions in that it is impossible to attribute a specific molecule of pollution
to a specific health effect. That fact does nothing to undercut the scientific
understanding or the EPA's judgment that pollution "causes or contributes
to" health and welfare effects. Litigants might also challenge the credibility
of the IPCC's or the EPA's reliance on external scientific information, as
some did (unsuccessfully) in challenges to the EPA's 2009 endangerment
finding. 73 Such arguments failed then and would presumably fail now.
Moreover, a reviewing court would be highly deferential to EPA
74
decisions on any of these issues related to a § 115 endangerment finding.
In legal terms, any challenge would have to establish that the EPA had
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in making its determination in violation of
the Clean Air Act. 75 An EPA judgment on endangerment that is merely
different from what challengers or even a reviewing court might prefer will
not be rejected by that court.
Even if all else fails, as noted above, a formal request from the Secretary
of State is sufficient basis for an endangerment finding. 76 It seems
extremely unlikely that a reviewing court would interfere with such a
request. Nothing in § 115 limits the conditions under which such a request
could be made by the secretary or followed by the EPA, and a reviewing

73.

See Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 119-22 (D.C. Cir.

2012).
74. Id. at 120. ("'Although we perform a searching and careful inquiry into the facts
underlying the agency's decisions, we will presume the validity of agency action as long as a
rational basis for it is presented.' In so doing, 'we give an extreme degree of deference to the
agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise."') (quoting Am.
Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) ("In the case of review of any action of the
Administrator to which this subsection applies, the court may reverse any such action found
to be .
law").
76.

. .

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

See id. § 7415(a).
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court would seem likely to refuse to interfere in deference to the executive's
77
traditional foreign affairs power.
B. Reciprocipy
Section 115's international trigger comes with a condition, however: the
foreign country or countries found to be endangered by U.S. pollution must
give the United States reciprocal rights. 78 Specifically, the country (or
countries) must give "the United States essentially the same rights with
respect to the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that
country as is given that country by this section." 79 Advocates of § 115
suggest this condition could also be easily met, 80 based on other nations'
limitation of their own GHG emissions (such as the EU's emissions trading
program),81 political commitments to reduce emissions like those between
the United States and China, 82 or the recent Paris climate agreement. 83
Section 115 advocates suggest that the triggers of GHG regulation under
§ 115 are effectively a formality; they have already been accomplished, or
could be easily. Legal scholars analyzing § 115 have discussed the meaning
and practical impact of this reciprocity condition at some length,
considering whether it refers to procedural or substantive rights and what
international commitments or domestic laws in other countries would
84
qualify.
As with a § 115 endangerment finding, challenges to reciprocity are still
possible, even likely. Litigants may claim (accurately) that none of the
international agreements or foreign programs -the United States-China
executive agreements, the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU
ETS), or the Paris Agreement-give the United States legally binding or
enforceable rights to limit foreign emissions that harm the United States.
The China agreement is a set of simultaneous promises, not a binding

77. See, e.g., Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) ("The Court also has
recognized the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and
responsibility of the Executive.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7415(c).

79. Id.
80.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 20.
81. Id.at 41.
82. Id. at 30-32.
83. Id. at 26-30.
84. Id. at 20-43 (discussing reciprocity issue in terms of substance and procedure, and
concluding that reciprocity is readily established on multiple grounds); see also Chang, supra
note 25, at 10,901-03.
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bilateral commitment.8 5 The ETS is binding on EU members but does not
claim to specifically reduce emissions that affect the United States. 86 And
the Paris Agreement commits its signatories only to individually defined
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), not to concrete
emissions goals. 87 Therefore, the challengers would presumably argue,
reciprocity does not exist in a legal sense.
These critiques of existing climate agreements have some validity, but
they are probably insufficient for a reviewing court to reject an EPA finding
of reciprocity. One response is that § 115 does not require legally binding
international agreements to establish reciprocity. Instead, § 115 requires
only that other countries give the United States "essentially the same
rights." Section 115 advocates do not suggest that EPA allow other
countries to specifically intervene in U.S. policymaking to reduce U.S.
carbon emissions, but rather that the agency implement a policy
unilaterally reducing U.S. emissions. Parallel efforts elsewhere to reduce
emissions, whether under bilateral executive agreements, EU treaties, or
the Paris Agreement, are therefore "reciprocal" because they similarly
commit other countries to domestic actions. Similarly, all such actions are
aimed at the common threat of climate change, not at reducing harms in a
specific other country. Defining reciprocity to include only such direct
interactions is inconsistent with the international character of climate harms
and the globally mixed nature of GHGs.
Of course, challengers may suggest that this inconsistency is evidence
that § 115 is a poor fit for climate change, and that Congress could not
have intended it to be used for global pollution problems. This argument
against reciprocity is somewhat harder to dismiss, but it probably founders
on the same rocks as the argument against endangerment and rejected by
the Massachusetts court.8 8 All countries that have committed to reducing
their carbon emissions have done so to mitigate worldwide harms, even
though their own reductions are insufficient alone to prevent those harms.
85.

See Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate

Change, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Nov. 11, 2014) (noting that the United States and China have
"announced their respective post-2020 actions on climate change" in an effort to "inject
momentum into the global climate negotiations"), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11 / 11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.
86. See European Commission, Climate Action, The EU Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS), June 4, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets.
87. The Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) (2015), art. 4.2 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/
cop2 1/eng/109r01 .pdf.
88.

See supra, Part II.A.
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Suggesting that such policies are not "reciprocal" is an extremely narrow
and legalistic reading of that term that can be rejected as readily as the
EPA's similarly narrow reading of "contributes" was by the Massachusetts
court.
Moreover, as with the endangerment question, a reviewing court is likely
to be deferential to the EPA on the question of reciprocity. To be sure,
whether reciprocity exists is superficially a legal question that judges might
feel readily able to determine on their own, rather than the scientific and
policy judgment embodied in an endangerment finding. But whether
another country grants the United States "essentially the same rights" is at
bottom a political judgment and, moreover, an international one. The
executive, not the courts, is better equipped to make the reciprocity
judgment, and a reviewing court is likely to follow traditional deference on
questions of foreign affairs. 89
In short, legal arguments against the EPA's most likely bases for the
endangerment and reciprocity findings necessary to trigger § 115 regulation
seem relatively weak. Courts are also likely to be deferential to the EPA
and the Secretary of State in reviewing such claims. But triggering § 115 in
the climate context is not enough; the EPA must also, with the states, set up
a regulatory program. That program will open up the agency to two types
of further legal challenges. The first type, considered in the first subsection
below, are general or facial legal challenges-that is, those asserting that
climate regulation under § 115 is generally improper. The second type,
considered in the following subsection, are as-applied challenges, asserting
that some important element of the EPA's likely regulatory approach is
inconsistent with the statute.
IV. GENERAL LEGAL RISKS
A. Can § 115 Support the Climate Elephant?
The first and most direct facial attack on § 115 climate regulation is
simple. The argument goes like this: substantial limits on U.S. carbon
emissions, implemented through a national carbon tax or trading system,
would be an extremely significant action both politically and economically.
If Congress had intended to delegate the power to take such action to the
EPA, it would have done so more explicitly and probably more extensively

89.

See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
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than with a short, skeletal, and (to date) almost completely unused portion
of the Clean Air Act like § 115. 90
Put in these terms, this is a rhetorical or political argument rather than a
legal one. But by reframing in terms of statutory interpretation and the
degree of deference given to regulatory agencies by courts, a legal argument
can be developed that is more or less the same thing. If accepted by a
court, this legal argument would lead to rejection of § 115 as a climate
policy vehicle.
The political and economic significance of climate policy is hard to
overstate. The climate problem is considered by many as the paramount
environmental challenge of our time, but even among those who agree that
action is needed, there is substantial and sometimes vitriolic controversy
over what form that action should take. Climate policy is at times a major
national public issue. Congressional debate over cap-and-trade legislation
dominated headlines in 2009 and 2010, with a bill passing the House
before similar legislation failed to reach the floor in the Senate. 9' Failure of
cap and trade has been frequently contrasted with success of health care
reform, with the two treated as comparable top-tier policy priorities for the
Obama administration. 92 The economic costs of a policy aimed at
reducing carbon emissions depend on that policy's design and stringency,
but carbon alone among pollutants affects every industry and economic
sector because of its direct connection to energy. Carbon regulation would
affect the bottom line of every business and household, and it could shape
the long-term fate of entire industries. Climate change and policies to
prevent it are a big deal.
The ultimately unsuccessful 2009 cap-and-trade legislation was
extremely lengthy, detailed, and complex. 93 It would have substantially
amended the Clean Air Act, excising authority over carbon emissions from
much of the existing statute and adding a new Title that would have
(among other things) set emissions limits, established a trading market, and
allocated emissions allowances. 94 Section 115, by contrast, is short-only a
90. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (2012).
91.

See Bryan Walsh, Cap and Trade is Dead (Really, Truly, I'm Not Kidding). Who's to Blame?,

TIME (July 22, 2010), http://science.time.com/2010/07/22/cap-and-trade-is-dead-really-

truly-im-not-kidding-whos-to-blame/.
92. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Harvard University Professor of Government and
Sociology, Remarks at the Symposium on The Politics of America's Fight Against Global
Warming (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/sites/default/files/
skocpol-captrade.report-january_2013_0.pdf.
93. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111 th Cong. (2009).
94.

Id. § 811 (c).
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few hundred words-and gives no detail on regulatory implementation.
Having been drafted decades ago, it does not mention climate change or
carbon at all (though the statute does not mention most pollutants it now
regulates by name). Can a climate policy similar in ambition to that
rejected by Congress in 2009 really be supported by § 115? Is an EPA
attempt to do so illegal?
1. The "Elephantsin Mouseholes" Problem
If one is a strict statutory textualist, none of this matters. The only
question is whether the text of § 115 delegates to the EPA (and states) the
requisite authority to enact a given policy. As discussed above, for its
advocates the breadth of the language in § 115 appears sufficient. The
Section applies to "any air pollutant," can be triggered by most any
evidence of international harms, and, through use of § 110 and the SIP
process, appears to allow use of most any regulatory tool. 95 That broad
language is enough, even if it lacks details. Neither the Constitution nor
canons of statutory interpretation require Congress to be verbose or
detailed when making a major delegation of authority.
But even professed textualists do not take such a narrow view-the
context in which statutory words and provisions appear is always relevant
for understanding their meaning. One expression of this fact is an
assumption that when Congress delegates substantial authority, it does so
clearly. As the late Justice Scalia put it in a 2001 Clean Air Act opinion in
the EPA's favor, "Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions- it
does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes. ' 96 Scalia did not
invent this principle, though his aphorism stuck, with other justices citing it
often in majority opinions or dissents. 9 7
The precise role and applicability are not clear. Defining an 'elephant'
in principle, if not always in practice, may be relatively easy; it is a
'fundamental' aspect of a regulatory delegation. But the same cannot be
said for mouseholes. When is a statutory provision sufficiently "vague" or
"ancillary" to qualify as a mousehole? Does that determination depend on
the size of the regulatory elephant, or is it an absolute? More broadly, what
role does the principle serve? Perhaps it is a clear statement rule, putting a
95. Infra Part IV.A.3.
96. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
97. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2796 (2014) (GinsburgJ.,
dissenting); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 239 (2009) (StevensJ, dissenting);
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006).
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burden on Congress to clearly articulate major shifts in regulatory authority
or protecting Congress from the worst implications of its own at times
inartful drafting. Alternatively, it may serve to limit the ability of agencies
98
(or courts) to aggressively interpret statutory text.
Whatever its rationale, most of the time the principle operates as a canon
of statutory interpretation-the text of a given statutory provision will be
read in light of the principle. Interpretations of statutory text that result in
major shifts in regulatory authority or "alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme" will be viewed with skepticism. This skepticism can be
overcome, though it remains unclear whether it is simply more text, more
clarity, or both that Congress must supply to grant such authority (i.e., so
that the text in question is no longer considered a mousehole).
The implications of this principle in the § 115 context are that a
reviewing court could view EPA authority to limit national carbon
emissions and encourage states to set up a trading system or carbon tax as a
The short,
major or "fundamental" regulatory shift-an elephant.
"vague" or
a
considered
be
could
115
§
unheralded
and
relatively unused
"ancillary" provision-a mousehole. If so, then the text of § 115, no matter
how open-ended and flexible, would be insufficient to support the major
regulatory programs its advocates suggest. The next subsection discusses
the implications of such a finding, before the following subsection considers
more deeply whether § 115 is, indeed, a mousehole.
2. The EPA May Not Get Chevron Deference
In a 2010 paper considering Clean Air Act authorities that the EPA
might use for climate policy, my coauthors and I considered § 115 and
argued that it carried great legal risk, largely due to potential wholesale
99
Advocates of
rejection by courts on "elephants in mouseholes" grounds.
§ 115 have not discussed this legal risk specifically-neither Chang nor
Burger mention "elephants in mouseholes" and its line of cases. To be fair,
Burger argues at length that a broad interpretation of the EPA's authority
00
under § 115 is compatible with the text of the statute.1 They also point to
98. See Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 19, 53 (2010); see also Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law: The
Resurgent "Major Questions" Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REv. 355 (2017) [hereinafter Richardson,
Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law].
99. See Richardson, et al., supra note 15, at 10,104.
100. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 1 ("The language of the provision does not limit
the agency to regulating a particular source-type, or a given industrial or economic sector.
Rather, it grants EPA and the states broad latitude to address international air pollution
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deference shown to agency interpretations of statutory text under the
Chevron doctrine as a reason to be optimistic-if the agency favors a broad
interpretation (as would be required if it pursued comprehensive climate
regulation under § 115), the deference shown to the agency under Chevron
would reduce the risk ofjudges overturning that interpretation.101
While it is true that Chevron might apply and that deference would be
helpful to the EPA's hypothetical case, Chevron has limited ability to protect
agency interpretations from "elephants in mouseholes" counterarguments.
This is because "elephants in mouseholes" is an interpretive principle, and
therefore operates before deference is available to agencies or even may
deny deference. To explain how this is so, a brief review of Chevron
deference may be helpful.
Under Chevron's standard of review, agency interpretations of ambiguous
provisions are given controlling weight by the reviewing court, so long as
those interpretations are "reasonable" or "permissible."' 102 The court
therefore asks two questions: First (Step 1), is the statute ambiguous? 103
And second (Step 2), is the agency interpretation reasonable? 104 Chevron
"deference" refers to the broad latitude given to agencies at step 2. But it is
available only after step 1 analysis has established that some ambiguity
exists in the text. To make this Step 1 ambiguity determination, courts use
"traditional tools of statutory interpretation," including the text itself,
its
context, and canons of statutory construction.1 05 The "elephants in
mouseholes" principle is one such canon, and therefore operates at Step 1
of the Chevron review process-before "Chevron deference" is available to
agencies.
Even if an agency survives Chevron Step 1, the "elephants in mouseholes"
principle remains relevant in Chevron Step 2. In the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Utility Air Regulatoy Group v. EPA,106 the Court agreed with EPA
that a provision of the Clean Air Act was ambiguous but rejected the
agency's interpretation as "unreasonable" despite the deference available
under Chevron-in other words, the agency suffered a rare loss at Chevron

through the Clean Air Act's state implementation plan (SIP) process.").
101. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Burger
et al., supra note 6, at 14-16.
102. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
103. Id. at 842-43, 845.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 843 n.9.
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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Step 2. Among other reasons, Justice Scalia (writing for the majority)
echoed the "elephants in mouseholes" principle:
EPA's interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous
and transformative expansion in EPA's regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant
statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American
economy, . . . we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast
07
economic and political significance. 1

The Court's interpretation of specific language in the Clean Air Act in
Utility Air Regulatoiy Group may also be relevant for how a reviewing court
would consider climate regulation under § 115, as the next subsection
discusses. Those specifics aside, the Utility Air Regulatoy Group opinion also
illustrates the legal threat of the "elephants in mouseholes" principle at
Chevron Step 2, beyond its role as an interpretive rule at Step 1.
To summarize, a reviewing court could conclude that § 115 clearly does
not give the EPA authority to enact major economy-wide regulation
because "Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes"-that is, the
court could conclude that the statute is not ambiguous in this respect (step
1) or that despite ambiguity, such an interpretation is unreasonable (step
2). 108 This possibility means that citing Chevron and the great degree of
deference toward agencies that it embodies is little or no defense against the
argument that § 115 is too "vague" or "ancillary" a provision to support
comprehensive climate policy. "Elephants in mouseholes" leaves that
determination up to judges alone.
Chevron deference could be denied to the EPA in a hypothetical case for
other, closely related reasons as well. The "major questions" doctrine
suspends Chevron deference in certain "extraordinary cases" with great
0
economic, political, or other significance. 10 9 The 2015 King v. Burwell" 1 case
is the most notable recent example of the Court employing the doctrine. In
that case, the Court rejected challenges to agency implementation of the
Affordable Care Act but denied Chevron deference to agency interpretations
of the statute.1

107. Id. at 2444.
108. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
109.

See Richardson, Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law, supra note 98 (discussing the

history of the major questions doctrine and its current relevance).
110. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).

111. See id. at 2488-89, 2496.
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The major questions doctrine is in many ways very similar to the
"elephants in mouseholes" principle, and in fact, I have argued elsewhere
that they are sometimes indistinguishable."l 2 Both operate to shift
interpretive authority from agencies to judges when the regulatory stakes
are great. Indeed, the two cases cited by Justice Scalia for the initial 2001
appearance of "elephants in mouseholes" are MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 113 and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,"14 the same two cases in which the major questions doctrine was first
articulated.
The boundaries of the major questions doctrine are not clear, and it has
only occasionally been invoked. But a challenge to comprehensive climate
regulation under the Clean Air Act would at least be a strong candidate for
a major questions case. In a recent analysis of the doctrine, I discussed how
prospective Clean Power Plan litigation is a rare example of a case that
arguably implicates all four factors that the Supreme Court has previously
associated with "extraordinary" cases" to which the major questions
doctrine applies. 115 Those four factors-economic significance, political
significance, a change in agency position, and limited statutory text-all
also apply to climate regulation under § 115. If this reading is correct and
litigation over an EPA climate program under § 115 is deemed an
"extraordinary case," then Chevron deference will not be available.
Taken together, the major questions doctrine and the "elephants in
mouseholes" principle make relying on Chevron to support EPA's reading of
§ 115 imprudent.
3. Does "Elephantsin Mouseholes" Really Hurt § 115?
This does not end legal debate over the fitness of § 115 as a vehicle for
climate policy; it merely shifts it to a different arena. Rather than simply
appealing to the breadth and ambiguity of § 115's text, and to Chevron
deference, it is necessary to consider whether § 115 really is a "vague" or
"ancillary" mousehole in the legal sense. This is far from a foregone
conclusion.
As noted above, the best arguments that § 115 is indeed a mousehole are
its brevity and lack of detail. What text there is in § 115 deals primarily
with its international triggers, with relatively little said about how pollution
limits would be set under the section and nothing on what form regulation
112. See Richardson, Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law, supra note 98.

113. 512U.S.218(1994).
114. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
115.

Richardson, Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law, supra note 98.
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would take. Read alone, § 115 appears both vague (in that it lacks clarity)
and ancillary (in that it lacks detail). The fact that the EPA has almost
never used § 115 might also be evidence of its ancillary character. Finally,
and assuming one considers legislative history to be relevant to statutory
interpretation, there is some evidence that Congress envisioned § 115 only
as a tool to address localized cross-border pollution between the United
States and Canada or Mexico.116 Congress may not have envisioned
climate change or possibly even globally mixed air pollution at all when the
provision was first considered in the 1960s and 1970s. If correct, this
further supports the claim that § 115 is an "ancillary" provision aimed at
less important pollution problems. However, strong counterarguments
exist for each of these claims. Taken together, they may be sufficient to
prove § 115 is no mousehole at all.
Most important, § 115 is neither as short nor as vague as it initially
seems. As discussed above, the regulatory meat of § 115 comes from its
reference to states' powers (and responsibilities) to create SIPs under § 110.
In fact, § 115 can be viewed as little more than an alternative entry point to
the well-understood and detailed § 110 SIP process. Section 110 is a core
provision of the Clean Air Act, arguably the core provision, and cannot be
considered "vague" or "ancillary." Under this view, § 115 should not be
deemed a mousehole in comparison to other, comprehensive delegations of
authority under the Clean Air Act, such as the NAAQS program embodied
in §§ 108-110, or new motor vehicle regulations in Title II. III
Instead, a better comparison is to § 108 alone. Under that section, the
EPA is charged with identifying pollutants that endanger public health or
118
Like
welfare, and setting the national air quality standards for them.
119
This is
§ 115, § 108 does not say how those pollutants will be regulated.
unsurprising, however; both rely on § 110 for implementation through the
states. Section 115 is not appreciably shorter than § 108. Section 108 is
arguably more precise (i.e., less vague), but if so, this too is unsurprising.
Section 108 directs the EPA to do its own review of scientific evidence of
116.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 8-9 (quoting S. COMM. ENV'T & PUB. WORKS,

CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS AND SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT, S. REP. No. 89-192, at 4

(1965) ("The committee urges the administration to seek agreements with Canada and
Mexico to help protect U.S. citizens from air pollution originating in those countries."). But
see Udall, supra note 22 (arguing that at least some in Congress did recognize the risks of
anthropogenic climate change, even in the mid-i 960s, and may have viewed the precursors
of § 115 as a vehicle through which to limit GHG emissions).
117. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
118.

Id. § 7408.

119.

Id.
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pollution-related harms,120 while § 115 relies on outside bodies
(international organizations or the Secretary of State). 121
If this view is correct, then the combination of threshold determinations
in § 115 and regulatory implementation in § 1 10 should no more be a
mousehole than the same pairing in § 108 and § 110. The NAAQS
program authorized by §§ 108- 110 has been extensively developed by the
EPA and litigated (indeed, it was the subject of Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations,122 the case in which the "elephants in mouseholes" principle
was first articulated in those terms). 123 It is implausible to suggest that it is a
statutory mousehole, so the same may very well be true for § 115, when
considered with § 110.
Moreover, the key regulatory powers under a § 115 regulatory
program-to use market-based tools, set the geographic scope of markets,
and above all enforce against emitters-belong to states, not the EPA, at
least in the first instance.1 24 States' inherent police powers therefore are an
additional source of legal authority. If § 115 does not have to bear that
weight, it looks less like a mousehole (or the regulatory program looks less
like an elephant-the distinction is sometimes tricky).
The claim that Congress intended § 115 to apply only to countries
bordering the United States (i.e., Canada and Mexico), and therefore that it
is an "ancillary" provision of limited importance, is also weak, as Burger et
al. argue. 125 Congress easily could have so limited § 115 but did not do so.
The reference to international organizations also implies a broader scope
than bilateral relations with one or two neighboring countries.
Moreover, if one supports § 115 as an alternative to regulating carbon
under other Clean Air Act provisions, these programs and § 115 may face
these same legal risks. This is most apparent with the Clean Power Plan,
which is currently being litigated. 126 Section 11 (d), on which the Clean
Power Plan is based, is even shorter than § 115 and has also been used only
rarely. 127 Like § 115, it also suffers from a lack of detail on how regulatory
120.
121.

Id. § 7408(a)(2).
Id. § 7415.

531 U.S. 457(2001).
id. at 468.
124. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
125. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 33.
126. SeeWestVirginiav. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
Megan Ceronsky et al., Resolved. EPA and States Can Regulate Emissions Outside
127. See, e.g.,
122.
123.

the Facility Fence Line Under Clean Air Act § 111, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10255, 10255-57 (2014).
The debate transcript in which David Doniger of environmental group NRDC argues

§ 111 (d) is largely a blank slate for EPA regulation. Jeffrey Holmstead counters that, while
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programs under its authority can be implemented. It may therefore be a
mousehole. Even if not economy-wide, as would be possible under § 115,
the Clean Power Plan's regulation of the electric power sector is probably a
regulatory elephant. Chevron deference therefore may not be available to
the EPA in Clean Power Plan litigation either. For similar reasons (and as
noted above), the Clean Power Plan litigation could be considered an
"extraordinary case" to which the major questions doctrine applies. 128 A
small piece of evidence of the extraordinary character of the case is the
Supreme Court's unprecedented interlocutory stay of the Clean Power Plan
in early 2016.129 The Clean Power Plan litigation and litigation over a
future § 115 program are similar in this respect, and its outcomes therefore
may be linked-if the Clean Power Plan is treated as a mousehole hiding
an elephant, or as a major questions case, it becomes much more likely that
a court would treat § 115 similarly.
If one assumes therefore that EPA must (or at least will) choose some
Clean Air Act vehicle for climate regulation, then the "elephants in
mouseholes" critique of § 115 adds little or no significant legal risk over
other options like § 11 l(d).l1 0 This could cut either way. For the climateregulatory cynic, any attempt to shoehorn climate regulation into a 1970svintage statute is putting an elephant in a mousehole. For the optimist, a
legal argument that would essentially say that all or most provisions of the
statute are "vague" or "ancillary" cannot be correct.
Perhaps one could distinguish § 115 climate regulation from that under
other provisions by focusing on its economy-wide rather than sector-bysector nature, but that seems like an overly fine distinction. As suggested
above, regulating a whole sector is probably just as much a regulatory
elephant as regulating the whole economy. That said, such a distinction at
least forces § 115's critics onto narrower ground and opens the "elephant"
question to debate as well as the mousehole.
My view is that the "elephants in mouseholes" principle and, more
broadly, possible denial of Chevron deference to EPA in litigation over § 115
legal policy constitute a substantial legal risk. But the more I consider the
issue, the stronger the counterarguments become. I do now think I was too
quick to dismiss § 115 on these grounds when I first considered it in 2010,

the provision is not the "40 year old virgin" Doniger claims, it is still a relatively broad grant
of authority, albeit one that he argues must be applied to each facility individually. Id.
128. See Richardson, Keeping Big Casesfrom Making Bad Law, supra note 98.
129. See West Virginia, 136 S. Ct. 1000.
130. The EPA's Clean Power Plan, based on § 111 (d) of the statute as noted above, is
currently the subject of significant litigation. See West Virginia, 136 S. Ct. 1000.

2017]

THE LEGAL RISKS (AND PROMISE) OF CLIMATE Poucr

especially given the legal challenges now advanced against the § 11 (d)
regulation we suggested as the preferable, or at least knowable, pathway
3
(not that we suggested in 2010 that § 111(d) was without legal risk).1 '
Climate policy using either § 115 and § 111 (d) carries similar legal risk from
courts' potential skepticism toward major policy innovation (the major
questions doctrine), especially when based on narrow statutory provisions
(elephants in mouseholes).

B. Does § 115 Apply Only to the Six NAAQS Pollutants?
Even if§ 115's reliance on § 110's implementation powers may insulate it
against the claim that it is a regulatory mousehole, that connection
ironically opens another legal vulnerability: does § 115 apply only to the six
"criteria" pollutants regulated under the §§ 108-10 NAAQS program? If
so, then climate regulation under § 115 would be impossible, at least
without setting a NAAQS for GHGs-something the EPA and most
observers think would be unworkable.
Like the "elephants in mouseholes" argument against § 115, this claim is
at heart relatively simple. First, the state-driven SIP process in § 110 is
traditionally and almost exclusively aimed at achieving the NAAQS for the
six criteria pollutants. Second, as described above, § 115 is an international
analogue to § 108, the domestic starting point for NAAQS regulations.
Therefore, this argument goes, § 115 should be limited to those same
pollutants.

1. The Casefor a NAAQS-Only § 115
There is more to this argument than a simple analogy. First, the § 115
and § 110 combination lacks important components of the §§ 108-10
NAAQS process. Section 108 requires the EPA to consider "the latest
scientific knowledge" on the potential harms, actual effects, and
atmospheric interactions of air pollutants. 132 This ensures (in theory, at
least) that NAAQS are based on the best available scientific evidence.
Section 115 requires no § 108-style scientific review, instead relying only on
international organizations or the Secretary of State to provide the basis for
an endangerment finding.133 Section 108 also provides for periodic review
of scientific evidence, allowing the EPA to update the NAAQS. 134 Section

131.

See Richardson et al., Structure, Effects, and Implications, supra note 15, at 10,104-106.

132.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (2012).

133. See id. § 7415(a).
134. Id. § 7408(a)(1).
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115 provides for no such review process. 135 On what basis is the agency
supposed to evaluate the international evidence it considers under § 115?
Lack of direction for the EPA in these respects may imply that Congress
intended the EPA to rely on the determinations made under § 108 that are
available only for criteria pollutants.
For such pollutants, EPA already has strong evidence that has survived
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process that the pollutants in question
cause public health harms. The international evidence that triggers § 115
serves only, this argument suggests, to establish that U.S. pollutants are
causing foreign harms above and beyond the domestic harms already
identified in the § 108 endangerment finding. Or to put it differently, if
Congress intended for the EPA to consider new pollutants under § 115 not
regulated under the NAAQS, it would have done so more explicitly (an
"elephants in mouseholes" argument) or at least would have given the
agency § 108-style direction on how to select, evaluate, and review evidence
of harms.
Second, § 115's integration with the § 1 10 SIP process distinguishes it
from other Clean Air Act provisions being used to regulate GHGs. Unlike
§ 115, Title II of the statute provides a comprehensive, self-contained
regime for evaluating pollutants from motor vehicles and regulating the
sources of those pollutants-engines and fuels.136 Section 111 of the statute
governing new- and existing-source performance standards is similar in this
respect. 137
It gives the EPA guidance and authority to identify
endangerment (here, source categories or industrial sectors rather than
pollutants) and impose certain kinds of regulation on the sources of that
endangerment. 1 38 Section 115, by contrast, creates no such independent
regulatory scheme. Its input is the international evidence of endangerment
discussed above, and its regulatory outputs are governed entirely by § I 10's
SIP process. 139 This can be interpreted as evidence that Congress did not
intend § 115 to operate independently of-that is, on different pollutants
than-the NAAQS.
If this view is correct, then § 115 can be used to regulate GHGs only if
the EPA first classifies them as criteria pollutants under § 108 and then
issues NAAQS under § 109. The EPA could in principle do this-there is

135.
136.

Seeid.§7415.
Id. § 7521.

137.

See id. § 7411 (providing detailed process for setting performance standards for

source categories of new emissions sources).
138. Id. § 7411 (b).
139.

Seeid. § 7415(a)-(b).
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almost certainly sufficient scientific evidence to support an endangerment
finding for GHGs under § 108. In fact, one interpretation of § 108-and
Supreme Court precedents considering that section-is that the EPA must
list GHGs as criteria pollutants. 140 Despite being petitioned on the point,
however,' 4' the EPA has shown little interest in doing so, 14 2 and most who
have considered the possibility have concluded that the NAAQS are a poor
vehicle for climate regulation.1 43 This is true for a variety of reasons, but
the most notable is that the NAAQS are set at a given atmospheric
concentration of a pollutant. 144 States responsible for achieving the
NAAQS individually (or even collectively) have little or no ability to
significantly affect concentrations of a globally mixed pollutant like carbon
dioxide. 145 A GHG NAAQS would, therefore, be set at such a high level
that it could be met trivially, or at such a low level that states would be
unable to take any action that would bring them into compliance. In either
case, a GHG NAAQS would be ineffective.
The EPA's interpretation of § 115 is restricted to NAAQS pollutants. In
a 2008 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), the EPA
considered various Clean Air Act provisions as possible vehicles for climate
regulation and requested comment. 146 It quickly rejected § 115, at least
independent of a GHG NAAQS:
Addressing GHGs under [§ 115] could allow some flexibility in program design,
subject to limitations of the SIP development process. Section 115 could not be used
to require states to incorporate into their SIPs measures unrelated to attainment or
maintenance of a NAAQS.... We request comment on the efficacy of using section

140. See Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does
Chevron Set the EPA Free?, 29 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 283, 296-99 (2010).
141. See Center for Biological Diversity, Petition to Establish National Pollution Limits for
Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
at
15
(Dec.
2,
2009),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate law-institute/global-warminglitiga
tion/clean-air-act/pdfs/PetitionGHG..pollution.cap_12-2-2009.pdf.
142. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,367 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (noting "major
difficulties" with a GHG NAAQS).
143. See, e.g., Richardson et al., Structure, Effects, and Implications, supra note 15, at 10, 10203.
144.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)-(b) (directing the EPA to set "air quality

standards," not limits on emissions).
145. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 44,367 ("There is little or nothing that a single State or region can do that will appreciably
alter the atmospheric GHG concentration level in that particular State or region.").
146. See id. at 44,407.
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115 as a mechanism to facilitate more effective regulation of GHGs through a
NAAQS. 147

2. The Casefor a NAAQS-Independent § 115
Despite the EPA's position, this reading of § 115 is not necessarily
correct. Good or at least plausible counterarguments exist to each of those
advanced above in favor of limiting § 115 to NAAQS pollutants. Recent
Supreme Court precedent may increase the risk of a narrow reading,
however.
For one, the claim that § 115's reliance on endangerment evidence from
international bodies or the Secretary of State is inferior to § 108's reliance
on "the latest scientific knowledge" is easily overstated. Reports from "a
duly constituted international agency" need not be scientifically inferior to
the EPA's own determinations; this certainly does not appear to be the case
for the IPCC reports on which a § 115 endangerment finding would
presumably rely. Moreover, there is no legal reason why Congress could
not have (or should not be understood to have) delegated endangerment
determinations under § 115 to the Secretary of State or, indirectly, to
international bodies, rather than to the EPA alone, or to have intended a
less science-driven process under § 115 than under § 108. In other words,
§ 115 is not incomplete in some way that should suggest that Congress
assumed a reliance on § 108; it is just different.
The history of§ 115 also provides some evidence that Congress intended
the provision to apply beyond the NAAQS pollutants, though the evidence
is susceptible to more than one interpretation. In its original form in the
1965 Clean Air Act Amendments, § 115 (then part of § 105 and the
primary regulatory provision in the statute for stationary sources) used an
"abatement conference" process to control emissions, under which a variety
of stakeholders negotiated reductions. 48
The 1970 Clean Air Act
Amendments introduced the modern NAAQS program, and § 115 was
therefore largely restricted to interstate and international emissions.1 49 At
the same time, a new subsection § 115(b)(4) was added, specifying that an
abatement conference for interstate air pollution "may not be called ...

147. Id. at 44,483.
148. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992, 996 (1965); S.CoMM. ENV'T & PUB.
WORKS, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, S.REP. No. 95-127, at 47 (1977) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 7415).
149. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1689 (1970) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 7403).
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with respect to an air pollutant for which ...a [NAAQS] is in effect."' 150
This provision had the effect of limiting § 115 to only non-NAA QS pollutants
in the interstate context, indicating an explicit intent of Congress that the
section applies beyond the NAAQS pollutants.
In the 1977 amendments to the Act, the abatement conference process
was finally removed from § 115 in favor of its current connection to the SIP
process. 15 1 As a result, the statute removed § 115(b)(4). 152 But a new
§ 115(d) was added to refer to the abatement conference process, stating
that conference recommendations prior to 1977 "shall remain in effect" for
any non-NAAQS pollutants. 153 Section 115(d) remains in the Act today.
It, like § 115(b)(4), can be understood to indicate congressional intent for
§ 115 to apply beyond the list of NAAQS pollutants.
An alternative reading is possible, however. By stripping § 115(b)(4)
from the statute and limiting § 115(d)'s reach to pre-1977 abatement
conferences, Congress removed or rendered obsolete the only provisions in
§ 115 that indicate it applies to non-NAAQS pollutants. The suggestion
that this removal of § 115(b)(4) and limitation of § 115(d) indicates
congressional intent to restrict § 115 to NAAQS pollutants is unlikely since
the removal of § 115(b)(4) was probably intended merely to clean up
extraneous material no longer relevant due to the scrapping of the
abatement process. Nevertheless, the absence of § 115(b)(4) and timelimitation of § 115(d) do limit those provisions' ability to demonstrate
congressional intent with respect to the scope of § 115. In my view, they
are evidence for a NAAQS-independent reading but are far from
conclusive. The Clean Air Act has a rich textual history, and it is likely that
further evidence for or against a NAAQS-independent § 115 lies within
that history.
Another argument against a NAAQS-only reading of § 115 is its current
plain text, specifically the broad scope set in § 115(a). As we shall see, a
recent Supreme Court decision substantially undercut this superficially
strong argument.
Section 115(a) applies to any "air pollutant or
pollutants."' 154 The Court's decision appears to foreclose an argument that
§ 115 was intended to apply to criteria pollutants only. Congress could

150. Id.
151. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 710-11 (1977) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 7412).
152. See id. (replacing the previous § 115 with new text, replicating some of the previous
version but not including § 11 5(b)(4)).
153. Id. at 710.
154. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
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have easily restricted § 115 to NAAQS pollutants explicitly but instead
described its scope in the broadest possible terms. Burger et al. argue this
point at some length, even suggesting that a NAAQS-only reading is
further foreclosed by subsequent EPA actions and Supreme Court
precedent. 155 Burger et al. point out that it is the same words-"any air
pollutant"-in § 202 that the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
deemed to encompass "all airborne compounds of any stripe," including
56
GHGs. 1
Massachusetts would appear to have ended this debate in favor of a
NAAQS-independent § 115, but a subsequent Supreme Court holding has
muddied the waters significantly. In 2014's Utility Air Regulatoy Group,
discussed briefly above, the Court partially rejected an attempt by the EPA
to include GHGs in a permitting program for new emissions sources and,
in doing so, reconsidered the Massachusetts court's reading of "any air
pollutant." 157
Some background on the case is helpful to understand its implications
for § 115. The Clean Air Act provision at issue in Utility Air Regulatoy Group
requires the EPA to conduct preconstruction permitting for any source
emitting more than 250 tons annually of "any air pollutant"-the same
scope language present in § 115.158 However, a strict interpretation of this
provision would have compelled the EPA to regulate large numbers of
sources with trivial GHG emissions-250 tons is a relatively small amount
of annual GHG emissions, relative to other pollutants traditionally
regulated under the Clean Air Act. The EPA, however, considered itself
bound by Massachusetts's maximally broad interpretation of "any air
pollutant"; the agency believed those words compelled it to regulated
GHGs under the provision at issue. 159 As a last resort, the agency issued a
"Tailoring Rule" in which it argued that forcing small GHG sources to
undergo permitting would lead to "absurd results" and therefore postponed
doing so indefinitely. 160 In other words, the EPA decided to ignore its own

155.
156.
157.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 44.
Id. at 45-46.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439-41 (2014).

158. Id. at 2436.
159. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70,
71) ("This Tailoring Rulemaking is necessary because without it, PSD and tide V would
apply to all stationary sources that emit or have the potential to emit more than 100 or 250
tons of GHGs per year...
160.

Seeid. at31,516.
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interpretation of the statute, with only the thinnest of legal defenses for
doing so.
The Court unsurprisingly rejected the Tailoring Rule, but it did not then
require the EPA to conduct permit reviews of small GHG sources. 16 1
Instead, the Court freed the EPA from the statutory trap into which it had
wandered by ruling that "any air pollutant" need not always be read to
include "all airborne compounds of any stripe," as Massachusetts had
done. 162 In making this ruling, the Court pointed to various contexts in the
Clean Air Act in which the same words appeared, but where the EPA had
limited their scope in practice-as the Court put it, "where the term 'air
pollutant' appears in the Act's operative provisions, EPA has routinely
given it a narrower, context-appropriate meaning."' 163 For example, the
EPA has never required sources to undergo permitting if the only pollutants
it emits are not currently regulated. 164 Massachusetts, the Court held, "did
not invalidate all these longstanding constructions," but rather depended
on the particular context of § 202 in which the "any air pollutant" language
at issue in that case appeared. 165
While courts presume that words have the same meaning throughout a
statute, that presumption can be overcome by context. The Court in Utility
Air Regulatoy Group characterized Massachusetts as depending largely on
context for its broad interpretation of "any air pollutant":
EPA's inaction with regard to Title II was not sufficiently grounded in the statute, the
[Massachusetts] Court said, in part because nothing in the Act suggested that regulating
greenhouse gases under that Title would conflict with the statutory design. Title II
would not compel EPA to regulate in any way that would be
"counterintuitive," or contrary to "common sense ... "

"extreme,"

Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the
class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion
would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme... . Massachusetts does not foreclose
the Agency's use of statutory context to infer that certain of the Act's provisions use
"air pollutant" to denote not every conceivable airborne substance, but only
those
that may sensibly be encompassed within the particular regulatory program. 166

In short, whether "any air pollutant" includes all air pollutants, and in
particular GHGs, depends on whether including the pollutants in question

161.
162.
163.

See Util. Air Regulatogy Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442-43.
See id. at 2439-42.
Id. at 2439.

164. Id.at 2440.
165. Id.at 2440-41.
166.

Id. at 2441 (citations omitted).
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"would conflict with the statutory design" or "be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme."' 167 If so, a more limited interpretation of "any air
pollutant" is permitted. 168 As the Court put it, "there is no insuperable
69
textual barrier" to a narrow, GHG-exclusive interpretation.
This is music to the ears of anyone arguing that § 115 should be limited
to NAAQS pollutants. Such arguments are fundamentally about § 115's
place in the statutory scheme and design-they suggest that § 115's
connection to § 110, among other factors, strongly implies congressional
intent to limit § 115 to already identified NAAQS pollutants, rather than to
open a backdoor to the SIP process for any pollutant causing international
harms. Utility Air Regulatoy Group therefore, at least appears to give EPA
license to interpret § 115 in this way, as it has done, without running afoul
of Massachusetts' maximal interpretation of "any air pollutant" in the § 202
context.
Burger et al. discuss Utiliy Air Regulatoiy Group, but only briefly. They
argue that Utility Air Regulatogy Group, supports a NAAQS-independent § 115
because "both the context and statutory scheme call for applying Section
115 to GHGs."1 70 Critics of § 115, of course, would make the opposite
claim. Burger et al. offer in support of their characterization of § 115's
statutory scheme that, "there is no more compelling example of emissions
y
While perhaps true,
that affect other nations than greenhouse gases."''
to
international harms
115
§
of
this is beside the point-the applicability
from U.S. pollution is not in question. The debate here is over whether
Congress's statutory scheme or design for § 115 extends to non-NAAQS
pollutants. If so, then § 115 could regulate GHG's even if their effects were
small, and if not, then they may not be regulated even if their effects are
significant. This does not mean that there are no good arguments that
§ 115's design is consistent with regulating GHGs-some such arguments
are presented above, and more are probably available. But Burger et al.
dismiss Utiliy Air Regulatoiy Group's negative implications for § 115 too
quickly.
Burger et al. also argues that a NAAQS-independent interpretation of
§ 115 is "patently reasonable" and therefore should be entitled to Chevron
deference. 172 The Utiliy Air Regulatoiy Group Court does say that the

167. See Util.Air Regulatoy Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2441.
168.
169.

at 2441-42.
See id.
Id.at 2442.

170.
171.
172.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 46.
Id.
See id. at 47.
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decision of whether to interpret "any air pollutant" broadly or narrowly is
initially up to the EPA-the agency gets first cut at determining what
interpretation matches the statutory scheme.1 73 The Court's decision is
significant in the Utility Air Regulatory Group context, since there the agency
felt its hands were tied by Massachusetts, requiring a broad GHG-inclusive
interpretation that would have required permits for small sources. But the
Utility Air Regulatoy Group Court went further than to license the EPA to
adopt a narrow interpretation of "any air pollutant"-it considered and
ultimately rejected the EPA's GHG-inclusive interpretation, deeming it
"impermissible" and therefore not entitled to deference. 174 Despite the
Court's holding that "any air pollutant" could take on different meanings in
different parts of the statutes, it held that interpreting the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) threshold requirements (100 or 250 tons) to
include GHGs was unambiguously an incorrect reading. 175 A court
reviewing the EPA's interpretation of the same language in § 115 could
reach the same conclusion. Alternatively, it might find that ambiguity does
exist in the § 115 context, but that GHG regulation is beyond the bounds of
that ambiguity and therefore similarly impermissible (in other words, the
agency could lose at Chevron step 1 or step 2, if Chevron is indeed applied).
This is a warning that Chevron may not be an adequate shield against
challenges to a broad reading of "any air pollutant" in other climate and
Clean Air Act contexts such as § 115.
However, Burger et al. correctly point out that the Court's stated
rationale for rejecting the EPA's interpretation in Utility Air Regulatoy Group
would not be present in a § 115 case. 176 In Utility Air Regulatoy Group, the
fact that large numbers of sources not traditionally subject to Clean Air Act
regulation would face burdensome permitting obligations led the Court to
conclude that Congress could not have intended such a result, and
therefore the EPA's interpretation of "any air pollutant" was
unreasonable. 177 But climate regulation under § 115 would not, Burger et
al. observe, require regulation of significant numbers of currently
unregulated sources. 178 The fossil fuel power plants, internal combustion
vehicles, and industrial facilities responsible for most GHG emissions are
already subject to various forms of Clean Air Act regulation.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Util. Air Regulatoy Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444-45.
See id. at 2445.
See id.
See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 46.
See Util. Air Regulatoy Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2444.
See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 46.
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While correct, this argument is not completely reassuring. First, many
important GHG sources, such as farms, forests, and natural gas distribution
networks, are largely unregulated under the Clean Air Act. A § 115-driven
economy-wide climate policy could lead states to impose regulations on
those sources via their SIPs. If so, a reviewing court could have similar
concerns to those that motivated the Court in Utility Air Regulatoy Group;
state or industry challengers will almost certainly draw this parallel. EPA
anticipated and attempted to avoid this argument by basing its calculations
of state targets only on sources and sectors already regulated under the
Clean Air Act. The EPA's calculations would cover most, although far
from all major emitting sectors. Such a limitation would not, however,
prevent states from deciding to limit emissions from other sources to reach
their reduction targets. State flexibility is one of § 115's virtues, but it could
in this narrow respect prevent the EPA from being able to avoid a source of
legal risk.
Second, Utility Air Regulatoy Group may be evidence of a general
willingness on the part of some Justices to limit the EPA's authority to
regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act by constraining the deference
available to the agency under Chevron. Indeed Utility Air Regulatoy Group can
be viewed as a revanchist reaction to Massachusetts, substantially limiting the
reach of the earlier case's holding without explicitly overruling it. Should a
majority of the Court take a similar approach in litigation over climate
regulation under other Clean Air Act provisions, such as § I 11 or § 115,
then Massachusettscould eventually be limited to its facts (i.e., to § 202 only).
Even if the Court does not go that far, Utility Air Regulatoy Group should
serve as a warning that broad readings of the Clean Air Act to include
GHGs may not be given the deference that Massachusetts and Chevron imply.
With the passing ofJustice Scalia, Utility Air Regulatory Group's author, the
risk that the EPA will not get deference may or may not diminish. Five
Justices joined the portion of Utility Air Regulatoy Group that rejected the
79
EPA's GHG-inclusive interpretation of "any air pollutant." 1 Two of them
(Alito and Thomas) went even further in dissent, calling for Massachusetts to
be overruled.' 80 Four surviving Justices, therefore, appear willing to limit
the EPA's discretion to read Clean Air Act statutory schemes to include
GHGs. The view of the Court's newest Justice on this issue will likely be
crucial. Justice Breyer's dissent in Utility Air Regulatory Group offers an
alternative path that, in addition to doing arguably less violence to the
179. See Util. Air Regulatogy Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2439 (Part II-A of the opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Kennedy, and ChiefJustice Roberts).
180. See id. at 2455 (Alito,J., dissenting).
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statutory text, limits the degree to which Massachusetts'sreading of "any air
pollutant" would be undercut. 18' If a Justice Gorsuch prefers this reading,
then Utility Air Regulatory Group, rather than Massachusetts, could eventually
be the outlier among cases reviewing Clean Air Act GHG regulation.
Nevertheless, relying on deference and the reasonableness of a
hypothetical EPA interpretation of § 115 seems ill-advised or at least
extremely risky. Both the Court's specific skepticism toward interpreting
the Clean Air Act to allow climate regulation in Utility Air Regulatory Group,
and its general skepticism toward broad regulation based on narrow textual
support in the "elephants in mouseholes" principle appear to be significant
sources of legal risk.
However, there is at least one more argument in favor of a NAAQSindependent interpretation of § 115, grounded in the Clean Air Act's
statutory scheme and therefore well armored against Utility Air Regulatoy
Group-style attack. As both Chang and Burger et al. identify, the state-led
SIP process is not and has never been restricted to NAAQS pollutants. 182
This fact undercuts the claims that by relying on SIPs, § 115 is by
implication limited to NAAQS pollutants.
As Chang notes, at more than one point § I 10 explicitly directs states to
write their SIPs not only to ensure compliance with the NAAQS, but also
to "comply with any requirements of this chapter" (i.e., the entire Clean Air
Act).183 Listing these requirements separately, the argument goes, implies
that Congress intended the SIP process to be a general vehicle for reducing
air pollution via cooperative federalism, not merely a means of achieving
the NAAQS. Burger et al. note that SIPs are not limited to NAAQScompliance measures in practice. 184 The new-source review permitting
program at issue in Utility Air Regulatoy Group is largely implemented by
states and overseen by the EPA within the context of states' SIPs-when
states modify their permit processes to include GHGs; they do so via SIP
revisions reviewed by the EPA. Burger et al. suggest that this not only
implies that SIPs may include non-NAAQS requirements, but even
forecloses a NAAQS-only reading of § 115.185 Burger et al. suggest that by
ultimately allowing GHG permitting under new-source review (and

181.
182.
183.

See id. at 2452-54 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
See Chang, supra note 25, at 10,896-97; Burger et al., supra note 6, at 44-45.
See Chang, supra note 25, at 10,896 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7410 (k)(5) (2012)).
184. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 47-48.
185. See id. at 44.
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therefore in SIPs), the Utility Air Regulatoiy Group Court adopted the broad
1 86
view of SIPs discussed above.
To suggest that a NAAQS-only reading of § 115 is foreclosed by Utility Air
Regulatory Group is probably an overambitious reading of that case. The
Court did, after all, substantially restrict the EPA's ability to include GHG
sources in the permitting program-only sources that must acquire permits
1 87
Moreover, such "anyway" sources
for other pollutants can be included.
are subject to permitting in most cases because of their emissions of
NAAQS pollutants (chiefly nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and particulate
matter). The Utility Air Regulatoy Group Court's decision to allow GHG
permitting only for "anyway" sources say little or nothing about the Court's
general views on the NAAQS-SIP process and its possible relationship with
§ 115.
Nevertheless, the fact that the statute allows the SIP process to be driven
by non-NAAQS pollutants does undercut a NAAQS-only interpretation of
§ 115. The kind of careful analysis of the Clean Air Act's structure-and
the EPA's past practice-that Justice Scalia did in Utility Air Regulatoy Group
might therefore lead to a different result in a future § 115 case. That is,
reading "any air pollutant" to include GHGs might be consistent with the
statutory scheme in § 115 even if it is not in § 169 (the provision at issue in
Utility Air Regulatoy Group).
The potential for a court-imposed NAAQS-only reading of § 115
remains a significant legal risk, however, especially given the reduced
likelihood of deference to the EPA's reading of the statute. This risk was
the EPA's justification for not pursuing § 115 climate regulation as far back
as its 2008 ANPR, and Utility Air Regulatoy Group appears to have increased
the risk, not decreased it. The textual history of § 115 provides some good
evidence in the other direction (i.e., in favor of a NAAQS-independent
§ 115), but it does not appear decisive either.
C. Can the EPA Allocate Carbon Targets to States under § 115?
A final source of significant legal risk for climate regulation under § 115
arises from the allocation of emissions-cutting responsibility to states. The
two legal risks for § 115 climate regulation discussed above are effectively
facial challenges-they assert that in one or another respect, § 115 is
fundamentally incompatible with regulating carbon. This is more of an asapplied challenge, but if successful, it would fundamentally undermine a

186.

See id. at 46-47.

187.

See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2447-49 (2014).
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§ 115 approach. This makes it appropriate to discuss it here rather than in
the next section, which deals with potential limits to the scope of § 115
climate regulation.
Section 115 climate policy advocates generally envision the EPA as
setting national, economy-wide emissions reduction goals, perhaps based on
the U.S. commitments made in its Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution (INDC) submitted to the UNFCCC under the 2015 Paris
Agreement. 88 The EPA would then somehow apportion this total national
emissions reduction responsibility among the states that must implement
§ 115 through the SIP process. 189 A variety of allocation methods are
suggested, such as per capita, an even split among the fifty states, allocation
based on past emissions, or allocation to equalize estimated marginal costs
of emissions reduction. 190 States would then be required to submit SIPs
that implement regulations (presumably market-based approaches, ideally
with interstate trading, discussed below) for EPA approval.
This approach works in principle-it could achieve significant national
emissions reductions while pushing implementation choices down to states,
ideally resulting in low-marginal-cost emissions reductions. As Burger et al.
noted, a national target allocated to states is crucial for § 115 climate policy
to work. 191 As they put it, "independent state determinations of GHG
reductions.., under Section 115 would prove unhelpful.
Successful
implementation would instead require EPA to establish an aggregate
amount of necessary U.S. emissions reductions."'' 92
But this approach is in some tension with § 115's structure, to the limited
extent that structure can be divined from the statute. Under § 115, the
EPA is charged with requiring states to revise their SIPs to "prevent or
eliminate" emissions that cause international harms. 193
For local pollutants carried across borders, the way this works is clear. If
Michigan emissions are carried to Ontario and cause health or welfare
harms there, then § 115 allows the EPA to require Michigan to reduce
those emissions to prevent or eliminate Canadian harms. Even for local
188. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 50.
189. Of course, the EPA might not pursue § 115 climate policy in the manner described
here. For example, it could take a bottom-up approach, assigning emissions reduction goals
to states based on their emissions intensity, or the emissions from certain sectors. The EPA
might not set a national target at all. Legal analysis of those or other alternative approaches
and associated allocation methods would be different.
190. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 54-55.

191.
192.
193.

See id. at 50.

Id.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (2012).
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pollutants, however, the reality would likely be more complex. If multiple
upwind states are responsible for various downwind impacts, the
connections, which are difficult to establish precisely, between the degree
and location of necessary emissions reductions (or that can legally be
imposed by the EPA) rapidly become very difficult to determine. The
EPA's tortuous experience with the Clean Air Act's "good neighbor"
provision aimed at addressing such upwind-downwind problems within the
United States is illustrative. EPA rulemakings under this provision-which
operates similarly to § 115, requiring SIP revisions in upwind states-have
been rejected by courts. 194 In particular, interstate trading has been largely
95
eliminated. 1
For a global pollutant like GHGs, how § 115 would operate is similarly
unclear. In some respects, the analysis required is much simpler. As
Burger et al. note, it is not necessary to attribute any one state's emissions to
downwind health and welfare impacts, since all emissions reductions are
196
But regulating GHGs
equally helpful for a globally mixed pollutant.
adds other complexities that § 115 gives the EPA no guidance on how to
address. First, § 115 does not give the EPA authorization to set national
emissions reduction goals, referring only to state responsibility to reduce
emissions with international effects. 197 Second, even assuming a national
goal can be set, § 115 says nothing about how or whether the EPA can
allocate that responsibility among states. In either respect, if § 115 does not
give the EPA the requisite authority, climate regulation becomes practically
impossible. Just as with a GHG NAAQS, discussed above, no state can
meaningfully affect international climate-related impacts alone, much less
''prevent or eliminate" such harms.
Burger et al. discuss both critiques and eventually dismiss them, but they
arguably undersell the associated legal risk. They dismiss the argument
that § 115 provides no authority for the EPA to set a national emissions
target on the grounds that they "prevent or eliminate" language in the
provision "requires pollution control rather than cessation of all GHG
194. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the
EPA's Clean Air Interstate Rule).
195. See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,272 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97) (limiting regulated emitters to intrastate
emissions trading).
196. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 57.
197. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b) (providing only for "plan revisions,"
referring to state-level implementation plans, rather than directing the EPA to set or revise
national standards).
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emissions."1 98 This is almost certainly a correct reading, but it seems
unrelated to the question of the EPA's authority (or lack thereo) to set a
national target under § 115. Burger et al. seem to move directly from the
(correct) assertion that a national target is necessary for climate regulation
under § 115 to work to the assumption that therefore, § 115 must allow the
EPA to set such a target. This is not implausible- § 115's silence on the
point should arguably be interpreted as statutory ambiguity that, under
Chevron, the EPA may reasonably fill.
An alternative interpretation is that Congress intended § 115 to apply
only to local pollutants, and that global pollutants like GHGs are
fundamentally incompatible with the § 115 scheme-as evidenced by the
lack of any federal authority to set a national target. In this sense, the lack
of explicit EPA authority to set a national target is further evidence for the
position, discussed at length above, that Congress intended § 115 to apply
only to NAAQS pollutants. And even if that argument can be rejected, a
fallback position is that "any air pollutant" should be interpreted to include
only local pollutants whose U.S. source and international impacts can be
traced, such that a national target is not needed. In reality, Congress
almost certainly did not consider globally mixed pollutants when it drafted
§ 115; the legal question is whether interpreting § 115 so as to allow
regulation of such pollutants is within the range of interpretive deference
allocated to the EPA (which depends in part on whether Chevron deference
applies; see above).
Even if the EPA prevails against such challenges and can set a national
GHG emissions target, it still must somehow divide that target among
states. Fortunately for the agency, the argument that § 115 does not give it
authority to allocate emissions reduction responsibility among states seems
substantially weaker. As Burger et al. identify, this is largely due to the
substantial existing case law on the analogous good neighbor provision of
the Clean Air Act aimed at addressing domestic upwind-downwind
pollution. 199 Just like § 115, that provision requires states to ensure their
SIPs control in-state emissions sufficiently to prevent or eliminate
downwind harms or, as the good neighbor provision puts it, ensure in-state
emissions do not "contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere
200
with maintenance by, any other State."

198.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 51.

199. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 55-57 (discussing case history of the good
neighbor provision).

200. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(D)(i)(I).
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As noted above, when an upwind-downwind pollution problem has
sources and impacts in multiple states, allocating responsibility becomes
complex. But courts confronted by the EPA's attempts to resolve this
complexity have not reacted by simply concluding that the good neighbor
provision fails to grant the agency authority to allocate responsibility among
states. Instead, they have consistently held that the EPA has some
These cases have carefully
discretion to allocate responsibility. 20 1
scrutinized the EPA's allocations, and rejected some of them as being
inconsistent with the statute, but they fundamentally have recognized that
some allocation is necessary. 202 If this experience is any guide for how courts
will interpret § 115, an agency interpretation allowing allocation of
responsibility to states might be closely scrutinized but would ultimately be
permitted in some form.
Burger goes further, suggesting that proportional allocation is likely legal
because some judges have gone so far as to hold that it is required in the
context of interstate emissions (citing the dissent in the Supreme Court's
most recent case reviewing regulation under the good neighbor provision,
EPA v. EME Homer City Generation20 3 and the D.C. circuit ruling in that
case). 20 4 Moreover, as they suggest, the level of judicial scrutiny of
allocation of GG-reduction responsibility might be substantially less than
that for traditional upwind-downwind pollutants since emissions reductions
of global pollutants are fungible among states. 205 In the GHG context,
there is no risk of the EPA mistakenly requiring states to reduce emissions
that are not actually causing downwind harms. It is still possible that a
court might reject a given EPA allocation, but that risk is probably lower
than with traditional pollutants, which should come as some relief to the
EPA, given its difficult experience with such allocations in recent years.
It is worth briefly contrasting the EPA's potential ability to fill these two
gaps in § 115. Why is it that a court might show more deference to the
EPA in allocating emissions reductions among states than it would in
201. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1606 (2014) ("the
Good Neighbor Provision does not dictate the particular allocation of emissions among
).
contributing States ....
202. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("The SO 2
regionwide caps are entirely arbitrary, since EPA based them on irrelevant factors like the
existence of the Title IV program. The allocation of state budgets from the NO. caps is
similarly arbitrary because EPA distributed allowances simply in the interest of fairness.").
203. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
204. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 727 F.3d 274 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see
also Burger et al., supra note 6, at 57.
205.

See id. at 56-57.
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allowing the agency to set a national target, when § 115 is silent on both?
One answer is the preexisting precedent on the analogous good neighbor
provision, which allows the EPA and a reviewing court to provide more
support for reading allocation authority into the statutory gap. 20 6 Another
is that the lack of explicit authority for the EPA to set a national target goes
to the fundamental scope of § 115, and its suitability for global pollutants.
In other words, it is relevant for the question of whether a GHG-inclusive
interpretation of "any air pollutant" is consistent with the statutory scheme,
as the Utility Air Regulatoy Group court would require. By contrast, statutory
silence on how to allocate responsibility among states is a technical
2 07
implementation issue of the type traditionally left to agency discretion.
Moreover, allocation issues arise with local pollutants as well as global ones,
as the EPA's experience with the good neighbor provision illustrates, so lack
of statutory direction on that point does not indicate that § 115 is unsuited
to global pollutants-it just reflects a general difficulty in regulating
complex cross-border air pollution problems.
Section § 115's silence regarding the EPA's ability to set a national
emissions target therefore appears to be a greater source of legal risk than
its parallel silence about how the EPA may allocate emissions-cutting
responsibility among states-at least assuming that the EPA sets a national
target instead of taking another approach like sectoral or state-by-state
targets. Nevertheless, an interpretation of § 115 that denies the agency's
authority to do either would make climate regulation under the section
effectively impossible-without a national target and a way to make states
responsible for progress toward it, there appears to be no way to achieve
GHG emissions reductions under § 115.
V. PRACTICAL LEGAL LIMITS
Advocates of § 115 suggest, in many respects very persuasively, that it
allows for more flexible, comprehensive, and potentially cost-effective
climate regulation than other provisions of the statute. Assuming it survives
the general legal challenges described above, this is probably correct. But it
may not be quite as well suited to climate policy as its advocates suggest. In
at least three important respects, § 115 climate regulation could be limited
by the statute. Although far from fatal, these limitations could reduce the
206. See id. at 55-57 (discussing case history of the good neighbor provision).
207. For example, in Chevron itself the Court approved the EPA revision of its
methodology for allocating emissions responsibility among co-located emissions sources,
under the so-called "bubble" approach.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

See Chevron U.S.A.., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
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appeal of § 115 compared to regulation under other parts of the statute. Of
course, the degree to which any limitations of § 115 climate regulation is
important depends on whether it is understood as an alternative to other
Clean Air Act programs or a complement to them.
A. Could TransportationSector Emissions Be Regulated under § 115?
The Environmental Law 101 description of the Clean Air Act is that
states have ultimate responsibility for regulating stationary sources in their
SIPs under Title I of the Act (which includes the §§ 108-110 NAAQS as
well as § 115), while the EPA is responsible for regulating mobile sources
under Title II of the Act.20 8 This is, unsurprisingly, an oversimplification.
As is undoubtedly clear by this point, the EPA plays a large role in Title I
stationary source regulation. States may and do regulate mobile sourcesthat is, transportation-to some degree in their SIPs. State vehicle
emissions inspection programs and regulations requiring gas station vapor
recovery nozzles to reduce the release of volatile organic compounds
(VOCs) are but two examples of such state regulation aimed at reducing
2 09
NAAQS pollutants.
The Clean Air Act does, however, impose some limits on states' ability to
regulate mobile sources. Specifically, it generally prohibits states from
regulating emissions from new motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines,
reserving that authority for the federal EPA and Department of
Transportation (DOT) in the form of CAFE emissions standards and other
regulatory tools (such as EPA authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
aviation engines). 210
Also, the Clean Air Act prohibits states from
regulating transportation fuels unless the EPA has not done so for the
relevant pollutant (the EPA extensively regulates vehicle fuel formulations
to reduce conventional pollutants, though not GHGs).211 In both cases, the
ostensible rationale for this preemption is to preserve a single, national
market. The preemption is not absolute, however-California is permitted

208. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2012) (generally prohibiting states from
imposing vehicle emissions standards stricter than those set by the EPA).
209. See, e.g., Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Vehicle Emissions Testing Program,
http: / /epa.illinois.gov/topics/air-quality/mobile-sources/vehicle-emissions-testing/index
(describing the purpose of Illinois vehicle inspection programs as a means of achieving
NAAQS compliance).
210. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
211. See Learn About Gasoline, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/gasoline-standards/learnabout-gasoline (summarizing EPA programs under Title II of the Clean Air Act regulating
the content of road vehicle fuels).
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to apply to the EPA for a waiver allowing it to set its own rules for both new
engines and fuels, and if the waiver is granted, other states may choose to
2 12
follow either the national rules or California's.
This preemption of state authority over transportation emissions applies
to § 115 regulation as well. This is significant because a large share of U.S.
GHG emissions originate from the transportation sector-in fact, recent
data indicates that the sector's emissions exceed those of the electric power
sector for the first time since the 1970s, making it the largest-emitting sector
213
in the economy.
The preemption does not mean that transportation GHG emissions
would remain unregulated-as noted above, the EPA is already regulating
emissions from new motor vehicles through the CAFE standards.
2 14
Moreover, the preemption is limited to new engines and to fuels.
Regulations on existing vehicles, such as inspection requirements, and on
indirect contributors to transportation emissions, such as land-use rules and
road design standards, are not preempted.
Nevertheless, the preemption means § 115-driven climate policy would
be unable to create a truly economy-wide emission regulatory or trading
system, able to equalize emissions reduction costs across all sectors. For
example, imagine a state, faced with a general carbon emissions reduction
obligation under § 115, believes that the cheapest or most politically
palatable means to reduce emissions is to limit sales of new high-emitting
pickup trucks. The allocation of authority under the Clean Air Act
prevents the state from doing so (unless it is California and gets EPA
The state would be forced to choose other, more
approval). 215
politically costly regulatory options.
or
economically
Alternatively, a state may not know which emissions reductions are most
cost-effective and could therefore conclude an economy-wide carbon tax is
its best option. But it is unclear whether the Clean Air Act's division of
authority would permit such a policy to be truly economy-wide within the
state. It is unclear whether such a tax could be imposed on vehicle fuels or
to the sale price of new vehicles based on their likely emissions. To be sure,

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
213. See Brad Plumer, Power Plants are No Longer America's Biggest Climate Problem.
Transportation Is., Vox (June 13, 2016, 11:10 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/6/13/
212.

11911798/emissions-electricity-versus-transportation.
214. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) ("No State or any political subdivision
thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions
from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.").
215. See id. § 7543(b) (detailing California's preemption waiver process).
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the Clean Air Act does not prevent states from imposing their own gasoline
taxes-all states currently have state-level gas taxes. 216 But it is less clear
that the statute allows states to enact fuel or new-vehicles taxes explicitly to
achieve Clean Air Act mandates.
Burger et al. suggest that the fact that the EPA has not set GHG limits
for vehicle fuels means that portion of the Title II preemption has not been
triggered, leaving states free to regulate transportation fuel GHGs.2 17 The
EPA's renewable fuels standard is aimed at least in part at reducing vehicle
fuel GHGs, with limited success.2 18 But as Burger et al. note, the renewable
fuel standard is authorized under a dedicated provision of the statute
(§ 211 (o)) separate from the EPA's general regulatory authority over vehicle
fuels in §211(c). 2 19 It therefore, they argue, does not trigger any
preemption of state GHG fuel regulations.2 20 If the EPA intends for states
to be able to regulate transportation fuel GHGs in their SIPs, such that
those emissions are within the same more or less economy-wide regulatory
system as other emissions, it may have to refrain from regulating in this
area in the future.
No such escape from the Clean Air Act's preemption on regulation of
new-vehicle emissions is available, other than the prospect of California-led
waivers.2 21 Such waivers could allow California and any other states that
join it in a potential interstate GHG emissions trading system to integrate
all transportation emissions into their § 115-driven climate regulations. In
the absence of such waivers, or for states that choose not to adopt
California's approach, the cost implications of excluding new-vehicle
emissions are unclear and merit economic analysis.
Moreover, ambiguity over whether states can include new-vehicle
emissions (or fuel-related emissions) in their SIPs complicates the EPA's
initial emissions target and allocation decisions. If the CAFE standards are
assumed to cover new-vehicle emissions while § 115 covers everything else,
then the EPA should set its national § 115 target at a level sufficient to
216. See Nicole Kaeding, State Gasoline Tax Rates in 2016, TAx FOuND. (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/state-gasoline-tax-rates-2016.
217. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 69-70.
218. See Program Overviewfor Renewable Fuel Standard Program, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
renewable-fuel-standard-program/program-overview-renewabe-fue-standard-prgram.
219. See Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2014, 2015, and 2016 and
Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 77,420, 77,421 (Dec. 14, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
220. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at 69-70.
221. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2012) (detailing California's preemption
waiver process).
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achieve policy goals or international commitments exclusive of projected
CAFE emissions reductions. If the agency then grants waivers to California
to write its own new-vehicle GHG rules and include them in its SIPs (and
other states follow California), leakage between CAFE and § 115 could
occur, and total emissions reductions might fall short. Similarly, once the
EPA allocates a portion of its national emissions reduction target to a state,
that state might be able to strategically switch to (or away from) California
rather than federal new-vehicle standards, bringing that portion of
transportation sector emissions into its SIP or leaving them out. In short,
the EPA probably needs to decide in advance whether new-vehicle
emissions will remain outside of § 115 climate regulation or whether it will
attempt to bring them in via the California waiver process.
B. Does § 115 Allow Interstate Emissions Trading?
Section 115 advocates envision it as a vehicle through which EPA and
the states could create a national emissions trading system. This flexibility,
and the potential cost savings it brings, is advanced as one of the key
advantages of § 115 over alternative or complementary pathways like
CAFE and the Clean Power Plan (though, again, both those programs do
allow or at least encourage some degree of trading). But it is not obvious
that § 115 allows interstate trading. Critics will likely argue that the statute
says nothing about it and arguably implies that each state must meet its
§ 115 obligations individually. 222 However, deeper analysis shows these
arguments against trading under § 115 are relatively weak.
Under § 115, each state must revise its SIP to "prevent or eliminate" the
international endangerment that has been identified. 223 As discussed above,
each state under a § 115 climate program would presumably be allocated
an emissions reduction responsibility by the EPA as a share of the national
total. But if a state engages in an interstate emissions trading program, it
might not meet that emissions-cutting responsibility. The state might not
reduce its emissions at all; in fact, state emissions might even increase if the
state is a net buyer of allowances (though, of course, national emissions

222. Some may wonder who would sue the EPA over inclusion of trading within a
§ 115 climate program, which seemingly would benefit both industry and greens. One
response is that counting on a potentially legally questionable policy surviving for lack of a
plaintiff is always unwise-all it takes is one (with standing) to get in court. Another is that
there are in fact plenty of potential plaintiffs, including greens skeptical of emissions trading
and industry challengers seeking any means of undermining the regulation.
223.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(b).
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would still decrease). Such a result could be deemed inconsistent with the
state's obligation to "prevent or eliminate" endangerment.
Courts have considered similar arguments in reviewing EPA regulation
2 24
of interstate pollution under the good neighbor provision of the Act.
That line of cases is too extensive to discuss in detail here, but the end result
has been that courts have effectively rejected interstate trading as
inconsistent with state obligations under the statute. 225 Could a reviewing
court reach the same conclusion under § 115? If so, only much less costeffective intrastate trading would be possible.
Such a result seems fairly unlikely, though it cannot be ruled out. The
reason is, again, the globally mixed nature of GHG emissions. In the
conventional pollutant context, a state whose emissions cause harms
downwind but that, instead of cutting emissions, buys allowances from
elsewhere has undermined the purpose of the regulation. Although total
emissions will have decreased, the specific harms caused by the buying state
will persist. To be sure, harms caused by emissions in selling states could be
reduced even more than the regulation required, but that is little
consolation in the context of the good neighbor provision, since its aim is to
prevent downwind areas from exceeding the NAAQS. The buying state is
still violating its responsibility under the statute to refrain from causing
downwind areas to exceed the NAAQS, while the statute is more or less
indifferent to the fact that areas downwind of the selling states have cleaner
air than the NAAQS requires. This makes sense because the NAAQS are
supposed to be set at a level adequate to protect public health (plus a
margin of safety). 226 An area where air quality is worse than the NAAQS
suffers harm, while an area with better air quality than required may not be
better off.
But this relationship breaks down for a globally mixed pollutant. States
are no longer in a meaningful sense "upwind," and affected areas are
similarly not "downwind."
Reductions anywhere have similar effects
(though it should be noted that co-benefits from reductions of non-GHG air

224. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("EPA's approach
[allowing trading] contravenes section 1l0(a)(2)(D)(i)(I); the statute requires each state to
prohibit emissions 'within the State' that contribute significantly to downwind pollution, not
to pay for other states to prohibit their own contributions.").
225. See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,272 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 79) (limiting regulated emitters to intrastate
emissions trading).
226.

See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
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pollutants are not evenly distributed). Areas affected by climate change
(i.e., more or less everywhere) do not care where emissions reductions come
from. Therefore, a state that does not reduce its emissions but instead buys
allowances is in fact acting to "prevent or eliminate" the endangerment its
emissions cause or contribute to, no more or less than a state that reduces
its own emissions without trading, or even a state that over reduces
emissions and is a net allowance seller.
A reviewing court should therefore reject analogies to the precedents
underlying rejection of interstate trading in the context of the good
neighbor provision. Interstate trading should be allowed under § 115. The
existence of those precedents does create some legal risk, but it should be
small.
C. Does§ 115 Allow States to Use Carbon Taxes?
Another appeal cited by advocates of § 115 is that it allows not only
interstate emissions trading but also carbon taxes.2 27 Many climate policy
experts prefer carbon taxes for a variety of reasons, including their
simplicity, political palatability to some groups, and ability to generate
revenue (though an allowance auction could also do so).228 Litigants
challenging § 115 climate regulation (or, more likely, specific states' § 115
SIPs) may argue that carbon taxes are incompatible with § 115. These
arguments turn out to be relatively weak, however.
States have the authority under their police powers to enact a carbon tax
(or most other forms of climate policy) on their own at any time. But,
advocates claim, § 115 is rare or perhaps unique among Clean Air Act
provisions in allowing a carbon tax to be used to meet EPA-set national
goals (i.e., to "count" for Clean Air Act purposes). 229 This claim is based on
the broad grant of SIP regulatory authority to states in § 110, which
authorizes, among other things, "economic incentives such as fees,
marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights." 23 0 "Marketable
permits" refers to emissions trading systems, and "auctions of emissions
rights" to the use of auctions to raise revenue in allocating rights in such
systems. 23' "Fees," it is argued, authorizes Pigouvian emissions taxes. 232
This may be correct.
227.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at v.

228. See, e.g, Adele Morris, The Many Benefits of a Carbon Tax, BROOKINGS (Feb. 26,
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-many-benefits-of-a-carbon-tax/.
229.

See Burger et al., supra note 6, at v.

230. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
231. See Burger et al., supra note 6, at iii.
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However, fees are not the same thing as taxes, at least in many contexts,
though the two are quite similar. Many states' laws distinguish between
taxes and fees, 233 and some states require additional procedures for
legislatures to impose taxes.2 34 Definitions differ, but generally speaking,
taxes are intended to raise revenue, while fees are paid in exchange for
specific rights granted or services provided by the government. 235 In short,
taxes apply to all, or at least to all that are similarly situated, while fees are
optional, being paid only by those who determine the service being paid for
is worth the fee. In some states, the operative distinction is whether
revenues are used for a specific, related purpose (fees) or for general state
236
expenditures (taxes).
Neither distinction is so clear in practice. But few taxes would be as
widespread in their impact as a carbon tax. Perhaps they would be levied
only on fossil fuel producers or importers to simplify administration, but
effects would be felt by all in the form of higher energy prices (just as
businesses pay sales taxes to the state, but all consumers ultimately feel their
incidence). If § 115 allows only "fees" but not taxes, it might allow, for
example, a state to charge a fee for a permit to open a new factory that
emits GHGs, but not to levy a general tax on fossil fuels or tons of carbon
emitted.
Such a reading of § 11 O's authorization is probably too narrow, however,
drawing fine distinctions that the statute does not support. For one thing,
the list of regulatory tools available to states for use in their SIPs is not
exclusive-§ 110 says states may use "control measures, means, or
techniques ... including" fees and emissions trading.2 37 So long as a tax is a
"control measure, means, or technique" (and it is), that tax is permitted;
fees and emissions trading are only examples, perhaps intended to make it
232.

Id.

233.

See Joseph Henchman, How Is the Money Used. Federal and State Cases Distinguishing

Taxes and Fees, TAX FOUND. (Mar.
files/docs/TaxesandFeesBook.pdf.

2013),

http://taxfoundation.org/sites/default/

234. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 3, cl. a ("Any change in state statute which results
in any taxpayer paying a higher tax must be imposed by an act passed by not less than twothirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of the Legislature .....
235. See Henchman, supra note 233, at 2.
236. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1351 (Cal.
1997) ("Contrary to the trial court and Court of Appeal, we conclude that the Act imposed
bona fide regulatory fees, not taxes, because the Legislature imposed the fees to mitigate the
actual or anticipated adverse effects of the fee payers' operations, and under the Act the
amount of the fees must bear a reasonable relationship to those adverse effects.").
237. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
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clear that SIPs are not limited to traditional command-and-control
regulatory tools. In terms of canons of construction, the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius principle should not apply here.
In fact, an even broader interpretation of this part of § 110 is that it
authorizes states to use any enforceable regulatory tools within their general
police powers not prohibited by other law (e.g., by the Constitution or
federal preemption). If that reading is correct, then carbon taxes certainly
are permissible under § 115. In either case, it appears just barely plausible,
though very unlikely, that a reviewing court would reject a carbon tax as
inconsistent with § 115.
CONCLUSION
Balancing the advantages cited by advocates with the legal risks and
limitations discussed above, does § 115 provide a viable vehicle for climate
regulation? The answer remains somewhat ambiguous. It is fair to say that
its advocates have substantially underappreciated at least some of the legal
risks associated with § 115. A court could rule that Congress intended the
section to apply to NAAQS pollutants only (or somewhat less likely) that the
EPA has no authority under the section to set national emissions reduction
targets and allocate them to states. In considering these challenges and
others, a court could also deny Chevron deference to the EPA on either
"elephants in mouseholes" or major questions doctrine grounds,
substantially reducing the agency's likelihood of success.
Even if a regulatory program survives these challenges, it may be less
ideal as a climate policy vehicle than its advocates suggest. The possible
inability to include some transportation emissions and (much less likely)
inability to allow interstate trading or carbon taxes could substantially
undercut its cost-effectiveness.
These legal risks may not individually be obviously fatal or even a dire
threat, but taken together they are significant. This is likely the primary
reason why the EPA has to date avoided regulating under § 115 in favor of
other sections of the statute.
However, the EPA's Clean Power Plan also faces similarly significant
legal risk. If one views § 115 as an alternative to the Clean Power Plan,
then relative legal risk does not obviously make one more appealing than
the other. The economy-wide character of § 115 and its likely greater
compatibility with market-based regulatory tools may therefore tip the
balance in its favor.
Alternatively, if one views the Clean Power Plan and § 115 as
complements, then at a minimum, further investigation of § 115 seems
warranted. Should the Clean Power Plan survive legal challenge, the EPA
must decide whether to apply a similar model to other sectors or use
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another vehicle, presumably § 115, to regulate the remainder of the
economy. Such an approach would not necessarily be as awkward as it
might seem. The two largest-emitting sectors (transportation and electric
power), in which the lowest-cost emissions reduction opportunities seem
clear, at least over the short term, would have their own dedicated Clean
Air Act programs in the form of CAFE and the Clean Power Plan. In
other sectors where the lowest-cost (political and economic) emissions
reduction opportunities are less clear, § 115 would allow the necessary
trade-offs, with states in the lead. The potential limitations of § 115 in the
transportation sector also fit well with this division of regulatory labor.
If the courts reject the Clean Power Plan, § 115 becomes an obvious
fallback option for the EPA, regardless of its legal risk. However, as
discussed above, the reasons why courts reject § 111 are important. If a
court reviewing the Clean Power Plan, for example, denies deference to the
EPA on major questions doctrine/elephants-in-mouseholes grounds or,
worse, overrules or substantially limits Massachusetts, then prospects for
§ 115 will become far dimmer. Denial of Chevron deference is in my view
the most significant legal risk for both § 115 and the Clean Power Plan.
The legal risks of the two policy pathways to some extent covariate and
legal challenges to each cannot be treated as independent events, reducing
the value of § 115 as a backup plan. Conversely, should the Clean Power
Plan survive then the prospects for § 115 improve as well, raising the
chances that § 115 could complement the Clean Power Plan, expanding the
reach of the EPA climate policy to other emitting sectors and balancing
abatement costs across those sectors. This is not to say that courts will
necessarily accept or reject both the Clean Power Plan and § 115 climate
policy-those decisions depend on the details of each rulemaking and the
two provisions do carry significant independent legal risks. But § 115
advocates should closely watch the Clean Power Plan litigation, as it will at
least provide important clues and could provide legal precedent for how the
D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court would view § 115.
If§ 115 and the Clean Power Plan are both rejected by courts, then new
legislation will be necessary to implement comprehensive climate policy
and meet the United States' international commitments. In such a
scenario, courts will have implicitly (if not explicitly) said as much in
rejecting climate regulation under § 111 and § 115.
The EPA rejected § 115 as a vehicle for climate policy in 2008.238 In
2010, I agreed with this decision. In 2016, it remains the case that § 115

238.

See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.

44,354, 44,482-83 (proposedJuly 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
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carries substantial legal risk. The EPA would be reckless to abandon its
current policy approach in favor of § 115. But further investigation of § 115
by both the EPA and outside legal and economic analysts is warrantedeither as a backup approach or (somewhat more likely) as a complement to
CAFE and the Clean Power Plan.
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